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The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-
Shatilla Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility 
Under International Law for Massacres of Civilian 
Populations©* 
Linda A. Malone** 
[T]he elders of the city who were near the slain victim who 
has been found (and it is not known who struck him down) 
"will wash their hands over the beheaded heifer in the valley 
and reply: our hands did not shed this blood and our eyes did 
not see." Deuteronomy 21:6-7, quoted in KAHAN REPORT at 12.1 
The I.D.F. [Israeli Defense Force], its soldiers and com-
manders, have been performing for three months a wonderful 
operation in Lebanon, which has brought and will bring great 
security gains. Every movement of our soldiers was known to 
us and was reported immediately. That is the tragedy of the 
camps. We did not know exactly what was taking place. For-
mer Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's address to the Israeli Par-
liament on September 22, 1982, in defense of the Israeli army's 
role in Lebanon. 2 
" Copyright 1983 by author. 
* The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and assistance provided 
by Francis A. Boyle in the preparation of this article. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas Law School, Fayetteville. B.A. 
1975, Vassar College; J.D. 1978, Duke Law School; LL.M. 1984, University of illinois College 
of Law. 
1. THE CoMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTo THE EVENTS AT THE REFUGEE CAMPs IN BEIRUT, 
1983: FINAL REPORT (AUTHORIZED TRANsLATION), reprinted in Jerusalem Post, Feb. 9, 1983 
(supplement) [hereinafter cited as KAHAN REPORT]. The Report may also be found at 31 
LL.M. 473 (May 1983). This article occasionally refers to government documents released in 
litigation under the Freedom of Information Act in the case of Jabara v. Schultz, Civ. No. 
83CV3100 (E.D. Mich. filed July 28, 1983), a case seeking to obtain all government docu-
ments relating to the massacres not subject to exemption from release. These documents are 
hereinafter cited as FOIA DocuMENTS and are on file with the UTAH LAW REVIEW. The docu-
ments contain two types of information particularly useful to this article: telegrams to the 
State Department in Washington, D.C., suntmarizing testimony before the Commission, and 
English translations of newspaper reports in Hebrew and Arabic. 
2. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1982, at AS, col. 2. Sharon's explanation to the Israeli Knes-
set only prompted outrage and fanned the outcry for an investigation. In the course of the 
presentation Sharon implied that when Shimon Peres, a sharp critic of Sharon, was Defense 
Minister, Israeli forces were involved in the massacre of "thousands" at the Tel Zaatar refu-
gee camp in Lebanon in 1976. Id. See also Salpeter, A Soldier's Record; Will Sharon Sur-
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We have found, as has been detailed in this report, that the 
Minister of Defense bears personal responsibility [for the 
massacres]. In our opinion, it is fitting that the Minister of 
Defense draw the appropriate personal conclusions arising 
out of the defects revealed with regard to the manner in which 
he discharged the duties of his office-and if necessary, that 
the Prime Minister consider whether he should exercise his 
authority under Section 21A( a) of the Basic Law: the Govern-
ment, according to which "the Prime Minister may, after in-
forming the Cabinet of his intention to do so, remove a minis-
ter from office." Conclusion of the Kahan Commission as to 
Defense Minister Sharon's personal responsibility for the mas-
sacres at the Sabra and Shatilla camps.3 
On September 16, 1982, the Israeli Defense Forces ("IDF") oc-
cupying Beirut as a result of Israel's June invasion of Lebanon per-
mitted the Phalangists, a Lebanese Christian militia, to enter the 
Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla. From approxi-
mately 6:00 P.M. September 16 until 8:00 A.M. September 18, the 
Phalangists, and perhaps other militia, massacred men, women and 
children including Palestinians, Lebanese, Iranians, Syrians, Pakis-
tanis and Algerians. The exact number of those killed cannot be 
determined-bodies having been buried in the ruins, deposited in 
mass graves and carried from the site in truckloads. Estimates of 
those massacred have ranged from roughly 300 to as many as 3000 
people. 
On February 9, 1983, an Israeli commission of inquiry into the 
massacres concluded that the State of Israel and several individual 
Israelis, including Ariel Sharon, were "indirectly" responsible for 
the massacres. The report of the Commission, known as the 
"Kahan Report," was publicized throughout the world. Time mag-
azine in its cover story reported that a classified "Appendix B" to 
the Report revealed that Sharon had discussed with the Jemayel 
family, two days before the massacre, the need for the Phalangists 
to seek revenge for the assassination of Bashir J emayel. Shortly 
vive?, 20 THE NEw LEADER 6-7 (Nov. 1, 1982) (discussing Sharon's involvement in the Beirut 
massacres and his ability to place blame elsewhere). Before the Knesset, Sharon also said 
that Amin Jemayel had been "actively involved" in Tel Az-Zaatar. FOIA DocuMENT No. 
326, Dep't of State Incoming Telegram. After this presentation, one of Sharon's critics, 
Amos Elon, an Israeli writer and political commentator, stated that by Sharon's own "con-
fession" in the Knesset, he was "a war criminal." N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, at A6, cols. 5-
6. 
3. KAHAN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 22. See infra note 280 for the outcome of the 
Report's conclusions on Sharon. 
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thereafter, Sharon sued Time for libel in a New York Federal Dis-
trict Court, alleging that the Time article charged him with in-
tending that a massacre take place. On January 24, 1985, the jury 
concluded that Time's characterization of the informlition in Ap-
pendix B was false, but that Time had not published the misinfor-
mation with the knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity re-
quired for libel. Sharon claimed the jury had found Time had 
"lied." Time conceded it had erred in attributing the information 
to Appendix B, but maintained the story itself was true. Sabra and 
Shatilla had become little more than a battleground for reputa-
tions and political aspirations. 
I. A NEED FOR JUSTICE 
On September 28, 1982, the Israeli Cabinet resolved to estab-
lish a commission of inquiry pursuant to Israel's Commission of 
Inquiry Law of 1968:1 International outrage over the massacres and 
the largest protest demonstration in Israel's history'~ compelled the 
Begin administration to establish the Commission, despite its obvi-
ous reluctance to do so. 6 The extent of Israel's involvement was 
only gradually revealed in the press after initial denials by the IDF 
and the Begin government of any role in the massacres.7 By Febru-
ary 9, 1983, when the Kahan Report was released, the massacres 
had already been absorbed into the morass of tragedies that have 
occurred and still are occurring in Lebanon. Yet with the issuance 
of the Report, the controversy was rekindled on a new 
level-focusing on the individual responsibility of many high rank-
ing Israeli officials, including former Prime Minister Begin, then 
Minister of Defense Sharon and then Foreign Minister Shamir.8 A 
brief flurry of reprimands (to the extent they can be denominated 
as such) followed. Sharon, the most harshly criticized cabinet 
4. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; see also The Times (London), Sept, 29, 1982, 
at 1, cols. 5-6 (reporting Israeli Cabinet decision of September 28 to hold an official inquiry, 
in contrast to its earlier belief that such an inquiry would be "tantamount to an admission 
of guilt"). 
5. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1982, at 6, col. 1; The Times (London), Sept. 27, 1982, at 4, 
col. 3. Other influential factors leading to the inquiry were the resignation of Energy Minis-
ter Yitzhak Berman in outrage at the Cabinet's failure to establish a commission of inquiry 
and President Yitzhak Navon's call for an inquiry. The Times (London), Sept. 23, 1982, at 
5, col. 2. 
6. The Times (London), Sept. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 8. 
7. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A1, cols. 2, 4 & 5; id. Sept. 21, 1982, at A1, col. 3; 
id. at A6, cols. 4-5; The Times (London), Sept. 24, 1982, at 6, col. 8. 
8. Jerusalem Post, Feb. 13-19, 1983, at 1, cols. 1-2 (Int'l ed.). 
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member in the Report, remained in the cabinet but lost his portfo-
lio. 9 The Report was heralded, in part by the Commission itself, as 
a triumph of democracy, a testing and reaffirmation of the princi-
ples upon which Israel and other democratic nations are founded. 
The conscience of a nation (or perhaps nations-including the 
United States) was appeased. 
Was there justice for the Palestinians, Lebanese and other vic-
tims of the massacres? Did the Report appropriately place blame 
on the guilty parties and impose or demand punishment accord-
ingly? From an international law perspective, the answer is no. A 
fundamental misconception of the Report is that it was a resolu-
tion of national and individual liability for the massacre under ex-
isting principles of international law. It was not, nor did it purport 
to be, such a resolution. For purposes of determining the issues of 
responsibility under international law, it is not necessary to scruti-
nize the Commission's factual assumptions. Even granting the cor-
rectness of those assumptions, clear, grave violations of interna-
tional law were committed by investigated individuals and by 
Israel as a nation. Although the Report focused only on Israeli re-
sponsibility/0 its findings raise serious questions of responsibility 
for other parties as well, including the United States. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there has been little discussion or 
analysis of the ramifications under international law of the mas-
sacres at Sabra and Shatilla, notwithstanding the moral, humanita-
rian and legal need for such analysis. The regrettable frequency 
with which similar massacres occur in the Mideast11 and else-
where12 and the desire to prevent future atrocities mandate an un-
flinching analysis of the responsibility and punishments dictated 
by international law. Although one may question whether there 
can be any retribution other than an eye for an eye in return for 
such wholesale loss of life, the goal of international law is not to 
provide justice in the sense of satisfaction, but to provide justice in 
the sense of order and ultimately peace. Perhaps more than any-
where else in the world, the Mideast demonstrates the hopeless-
9. I d. cols. 3-5. 
IO. See infra notes I36-38 and accompanying text. 
II. To cite just one example, there have been reports that hundreds of civilians were 
killed in September and October of I983 in fighting between the Phalangists and the Druze 
in the Chouf Mountains. N.Y. Times, Oct. I8, I983, at AI, col. 2, AIO, col. 3. 
I2. See, e.g., S. KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 44-45 (I983) (discussing activities per-
petrated in Vietnam); N.Y. Times, May I6, I984, at AI, col. 4 (discussing death squads in 
Indonesia). 
No.2] KAHAN REPORT 377 
ness and circular violence of retribution. 
This article uses the Kahan Report to demonstrate the ability 
of international law to provide an alternative form of justice to ret-
ribution. First, the article will set forth the Israeli law pursuant to 
which the Commission was authorized. Second, it will review the 
facts as found by the Commission and compare the most essential 
of those findings to factual conclusions from other sources. An 
analysis then follows of the responsibility of Israel as a nation and 
of individual Israeli officials under international law, based on the 
facts found by the Commission and, to some extent, by other 
sources. Finally, the article will explore briefly the potential re-
sponsibility under international law of other nations and entities, 
including the United States and the Jemayel regime.13 
II. THE ISRAELI COMMISSION OF INQUIRY LAW OF 1968 
The authorization under Israeli law for the Kahan Commis-
sion is the Commission of Inquiry Law of 1968, which empowers 
the Israeli government to set up a commission of inquiry whenever 
it appears "that a matter exists which is of vital public importance 
at the time and which requires clarification .... "14 That broad 
authorization is limited only by the government's definition of the 
subject of inquiry.15 For example, the Kahan Commission's charge 
was to inquire into "all the facts and factors connected with the 
atrocity carried out by a unit of the Lebanese forces against the 
civilian population in the Shatilla and Sabra camps"· and to submit 
a report to the government.16 Although a dissent may be filed, the 
13. This article focuses primarily on the responsibility of Israel and Israeli officials 
and military officers because ascertaining that responsibility was the Kahan Commission's 
task. Nevertheless, the magnitude and gravity of the atrocities mandate some discussion of 
the potential responsibility of other nations and parties for the massacres. The extent of 
discussion of any nation's or individual's responsibility is not intended to reflect in any way 
on the extent of the party's responsibility. Therefore, the extensive discussion of Israeli re-
sponsibility and the relatively shorter discussion of others' potential responsibility is not 
meant to indicate in any way that Israeli responsibility for the massacres is greater or less in 
proportion to that of any other parties or nations discussed. It is merely a reflection of the 
focus of this article on the Kahan Report itself. 
14. Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968, § 1, translated and reprinted in Legisla-
tion: Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968, 6 Is. L. REv. 410 (1971) [hereinafter citation to 
the Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968 will refer to the translated and reprinted version in 
the IsRAELI LAW REVIEW and will be cited as Commissions of Inquiry Law]. 
15. Id. § 2. 
16. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. The "camps" actually consist of many one-
room or two-room cement structures with several larger, mainly two-story buildings, all sep-
arated by alleyways. M JANSEN, THE BATTLE OF BEIRUT: WHY ISRAEL INvADED LEBANoN 97 
(1983). 
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Kahan Report was unanimous in its findings and conclusions.17 
The Commission may prescribe its own procedures without regard 
to the judicial rules of procedure or the rules of evidence.18 
The Kahan Commission held sixty sessions, heard fifty-eight 
witnesses and reviewed many documents.19 The inquiry was not as 
complete as it could have been, however.20 The Commission's first 
task was to hear witnesses, both those who had volunteered to tes-
tify and those whom the Commission summoned. Although the 
Commission published notices to the public inviting testimony or 
any other information on the massacres, the response was mea-
ger.21 One Israeli journalist expressed his belief that Arab wit-
nesses (who would necessarily include many of the survivors) did 
not come forward to testify from a fear of retribution or an unwill-
ingness to lend credence to the Commission's inquiry.22 The Re-
port states that it did attempt to collect testimony from witnesses 
outside of Israel, but its requests "were not always honored."23 
17. A commission of inquiry ordinarily consists of three members, Commissions of 
Inquiry Law, supra note 14, § 3, at 410, in this case Yitzhak Kahan, President of the Israeli 
Supreme Court and Commission chairman, Abaron Barak, Justice of the Supreme Court, 
and Yona Efrat, Major General. For a brief biography of the three members of the Commis-
sion, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, at 6, cols. 1-2, 4-5. The President of the Supreme Court 
is responsible for appointing the chairman and other members of the commission. In accor-
dance with the statutory requirement that the chairman be a judge of the Supreme Court or 
a judge of a district court, Kahan acted as chairman. There are no qualification restrictions 
on the appointment of the remaining members. Commissions of Inquiry Law, supra note 14, 
§ 4, at 410. 
18. Commissions of Inquiry Law, supra note 14, § 8, at 410. To obtain evidence, the 
chairman is empowered, with the "sanction of the commission," to (1) summon and resum-
mon a person to testify before the commission or "to produce documents or other exhibits"; 
(2) require a witness to testify under oath or affirmation; (3) compel the attendance of a 
person who, without satisfactory excuse has not obeyed a summons to appear; and (4) order 
the "taking of evidence abroad." Id. § 9(a), at 411. The chairman is also authorized to issue 
a search warrant "when it appears ... that a search should be made ... . "I d. § 12, at 412. 
An individual who refuses to testify is subject to a fine and may be imprisoned for up to two 
years on a second refusal to testify. Id. § ll(c), at 412. 
19. KAHAN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 2. Under section 13(a) of the Commissions of 
Inquiry Law, which allows the chairman to assign a qualified person the task of collecting 
material necessary for the inquiry, the Commission appointed staff investigators who col-
lected 180 statements from 163 witnesses. The Commission also "viewed television footage 
filmed near the time of the events at the camps and their surroundings." Id. 
20. For example, the Commission visited Beirut but was not allowed to enter the area 
of the massacres (the Report does not specify who did not allow the Commission to enter). 
I d. 
21. Id. 
22. A KAPELIOUK, SABRA AND SHATILLA, INQUIRY INTO A MAssACRE 81 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SABRA AND SHATILLA]. 
23. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. The Commission cites the example of the New 
York Times correspondent, Thomas Friedman, who published a widely disseminated article 
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The Commission's next task was to issue notices of harm 
under section 15(a) of the 1968 law. Section 15(a) requires the 
chairman of the Commission, when it appears that a particular 
person is likely to be harmed by the inquiry or the results thereof, 
to notify that person in what respect he or she is likely to be 
harmed and to place at his or her disposal the Commission's evi-
dence relevant to the potential harm. 24 That person may attend 
the Commission in person or through counsel and argue, make 
statements, examine witnesses and present evidence in relation to 
the potential harm.25 The Commission sent notices of potential 
harm to nine people-Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Foreign 
Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, Chief 
of Staff Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, Director of Military In-
telligence Major General Yehoshua Saguy, the unnamed Head of 
the Institute for Intelligence and Special Projects (Massad), G.O.C. 
Northern Command Major General Amir Drori, Division Com-
mander Brigadier General Amos Y aron, and personal aide to the 
on the massacres that originally appeared in the New York Times. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 
1982, at AI, col. 5. Mr. Friedman refused to testify on the grounds that such testimony 
would be contrary to his paper's editorial policy. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. Tbe 
Report states that it "did not receive a satisfactory answer as to why the paper's publisher 
prevented its reporter from appearing before the commission and thus helping it uncover all 
the important facts." Id. 
24. Commissions of Inquiry Law, supra note 14, § 15(a), at 413. Under the Commis-
sions of Inquiry Law, a commission is required to sit in public unless it deems it necessary 
to conduct any hearing in whole or in part in camera in the interest of protecting "the 
security of the State, safeguarding morality or safeguarding the welfare of a minor." Id. § 
lS(a), at 413. Therefore, the Kahan Commission held many of its sessions in camera to 
protect "nation[al] security or foreign relations" when discussing intelligence operations, 
IDF commands and the United States' involvement. KAHAN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 2, 4. 
Similarly, in accordance with section 20(a) of the Commission of Inquiry Law allowing a 
commission to refrain from publishing portions of the report if necessary to protect these 
same interests (e.g., state security, morality or the welfare of a minor), Commissions of In-
quiry Law, supra note 14, § 20(a), at 414, the Commission did not publish an Appendix B to 
the Report to protect "the nation's security and foreign relations." KAHAN REPoRT, supra 
note 1, at 2, 22. Appendix B became crucial to resolution of Ariel Sharon's libel suit against 
Time Magazine. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. 
For obvious political reasons, the Israeli government did not exercise its option under 
section 23 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law of obtaining the approval of the Foreign 
Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset to have the subject matter and setting up of 
the Commission itself remain secret. See Commission of Inquiry Law, supra note 14, § 23, 
at 414. The right to examine transcripts of the closed sessions and unpublished Appendix B 
was given to all members of the Cabinet, all members of the Knesset Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Committee, the general staff the Israeli Defense Forces and any person or class of 
persons that may be determined by the Ministerial Defense Committee. The right to ex-
amine Appendix B was also given to those sent notices of harm and their representatives. 
See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
25. Commissions of Inquiry Law, supra note 14, § 15(b), at 413. 
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Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, A vi Duda'i-26 The Commission 
limited its notices to those nine individuals, although "facts were 
uncovered that could be the prima facie basis for results that 
might cause harm to other persons as well," because the involve-
ment of such other persons was "secondary" and would be better 
carried out by other tribunals or groups, such as the military 
authorities. 27 
III. THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE KAHAN COMMISSION 
The Commission's factual inquiry focused on the events of 
September 16-18, 1982, when the massacres occurred.28 In keeping 
with its task as delineated by the Cabinet resolution, the Commis-
sion did not investigate or deliberate matters which were indirectly 
or remotely connected with the massacres, and it "refrained . . . 
from drawing conclusions with regard to various issues connected 
with activities during the war that took place in Lebanon from 6 
June 1982 onward or with regard to policy decisions taken by the 
Government before or during the war, unless those activities or de-
cisions were directly related to the events" that were the subject of 
the investigation.29 Nevertheless, the Commission did interpret its 
authorization broadly in one respect-the Commission did not as-
sume, as did the resolution, that the atrocities were committed 
only by "a unit of the Lebanese forces" (which the Commission 
equates with the Phalangists), but investigated whether the mas-
sacres could have been perpetrated by any other parties. 30 
As the Commission conceded, "not a few contradictions" 
about the facts evolved from the testimony; they were resolved "in 
accordance with the usual criteria in judicial and quasi-judicial 
tribunals," a phrase left undefined.31 The Commission did not pur-
26. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. The Commission heard witnesses and ac-
cepted written summations and oral arguments by counsel on behalf of some of the nine. 
27. Id. 
28. I d. at 2. A chronological summary of the Report's findings is necessary for analy-
tical purposes in several respects. Some factual foundation must be presumed in order to 
apply principles of international law and, as noted earlier, an analysis predicated on the 
Report's findings reveals grave violations of international law without recourse to less 
favorable factual scenarios that have been advanced. Moreover, the facts as found by the 
Report on the three days in question become confusing at times because they do not always 
appear in the Report in chronological order. Finally, the facts as found by the Commission 
have been largely eclipsed by the conclusions of individual responsibility in the Report and 
by the disturbing descriptions of the atrocities that occurred in the camps. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 3. 
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port to resolve all such contradictions, particularly those that "re-
late[d] to the content of conversations that took place between va-
rious people without the presence of witnesses, or when the 
witnesses' attention was not focused on the content of the conver-
sation, and there [were] not exact notes on these conversations. "32 
The Commission found such lapses in memory "only natural," 
claiming no "need to rule about those contradictions which sur-
round unimportant details that do not influence the decision about 
points in controversy."33 Surprisingly, some of the conflicts that 
the Commission did not resolve appear to be not only significant 
but crucial to determinations of responsibility. For example, one 
such unresolved conflict in testimony is whether Begin learned of 
irregularities in the camps from United States representatives on 
the morning of the eighteenth or possibly even earlier, rather than 
from a BBC broadcast on Saturday evening as he testified before 
the Commission. 3" 
The Report ultimately concludes that the only group directly 
responsible for the massacres was a Lebanese Maronite Christian 
militia known as the Phalangists, or Keta'ib, founded by Pierre 
Jemayel and led by his son Bashir.35 The Commission found that 
in 1982 the Phalangists were the primary power in the Lebanese 
Christian forces. The head of the Phalangists' intelligence division, 
Elie Hobeika, played a pivotal role in the events surrounding the 
massacre. 36 
The Report frankly acknowledges the symbiotic relationship 
between Israel and the Christian forces: 
The link between the Christian forces and the State of Israel was 
formed shortly after the civil war. In the course of time, this link 
grew stronger, from both political and military standpoints. The 
Christian forces were promised that if their existence were to be-
come endangered, Israel would come to their aid. Israel extended 
significant aid to the Christian armed forces, supplying arms, 
uniforms, etc., and also training and instruction. 37 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text. 
35. For a brief history of the origins of the Maronite Christian religion, see J. RANDAL, 
GOING ALL THE WAY: CHRISTIAN WARLORDS, ISRAELI ADVENTURERS, AND THE WAR IN LEBANON 
27-60 (1983). Bashir Jemayel was elected President of Lebanon and was assassinated shortly 
thereafter. 
36. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; see infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
37. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. For a history of the Israeli-Phalangist relation-
ship, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, at 6, cols. 2-3. As early as August of 1978, Begin secretly 
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The institute for Intelligence and Special Assignments (referred to 
in the Report as the Mossad and the Israeli equivalent of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency) was responsible for maintaining "a rather 
close connection" between Israel and the Phalangist leadership.38 
The Report was less scrutinizing of the relationship between Israel 
and the military force in South Lebanon-the "Army of Free Leb-
anon"-under the command of Major Saad Haddad. 39 Soldiers of 
Major Haddad and the Phalangists wore uniforms provided by 
Israel "similar to those worn by the I.D.F."40 More importantly, 
the Israelis exercised some degree of control over Haddad's forces. 
For example, pursuant to IDF orders (the only acknowledgment of 
Israeli control of Haddad in the Report), Haddad's army did not 
proceed north of the Awali River during the 1983 Israeli-Lebanon 
war.41 
In numerous meetings between unnamed "Phalangist leaders 
committed to the Phalangists that the Israeli Air Force would defend them against any air 
attacks by Syria. Id. 
The Phalangists' assistance to the IDF was politically if not militarily necessary. The 
Israeli public and IDF soldiers expressed dissatisfaction with fighting what appeared to 
them to be the Phalangists' battle for control of Lebanon. The dissatisfaction mounted in 
direct proportion to Israeli casualties in the drawn-out invasion. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 
1, at 4. As early as June 15, 1982-nine days into the invasion-the Israeli Cabinet adopted 
a proposal by Prime Minister Begin that the IDF forces would not enter West Beirut but 
would leave the task to the Phalangists. Id. Nevertheless, it was the IDF that fought and 
shelled various targets to control West Beirut. Id. 
38. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. Although the Mossad ordinarily was responsi-
ble for Phalangist-Israeli relations, the intelligence branch of the IDF, referred to as "Mili-
tary Intelligence," also was obligated to submit ongoing evaluations of the Phalangists and 
their goals and operations. I d. at 4. The attitude of the two branches toward the Phalangists 
diverged considerably. The Mossad urged strengthening relations with the Phalangists, in-
sisting that alleged Phalangist atrocities were "a thing of the past." I d. Military intelligence 
emphasized the danger inherent in relations with the Phalangists due to their lack of relia-
bility, military weakness and other reasons not specified by the Commission. Id. at 3. The 
head of military intelligence, Yehoshua Saguy, was forced to resign after the Report was 
issued and ultimately resigned from the army in August of 1983. 
39. See id. at 3. Before Israeli armed forces withdrew from Lebanon after their 1978 
invasion of that country, they established a zone across southern Lebanon under the author-
ity of the military forces of Saad Haddad, formerly a major in the Lebanese army. S. MALLI-
SON & W.T. MALLISON, ARMED CONFLICT lN LEBANON, 1982: HUMANITARIAN LAW IN A REAL 
WoRLD SETTING 6 (1983}. In January of 1984, Saad Haddad died of cancer. The Search Goes 
on For a Lebanese Exit, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 23, 1984, at 32. 
40. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4. The Phalangists' uniforms bore an emblem 
bearing the inscription "Keta'ib Lubnaniyeh" (Lebanese Phalangists in Arabic) and the 
drawing of a cedar on the shirt pocket. Haddad's forces had an emblem on the epaulet with 
"Army of Free Lebanon" in Arabic and a drawing of a cedar. The distinctions, or lack 
thereof, in the insignia becan1e a crucial factor in the Commission's resolution of direct re-
sponsibility for the massacres. See infra pages 396-400. 
41. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. 
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and Israeli representatives," 
the Phalangist leaders proposed removing a large portion of the Pal-
estinian refugees from Lebanese soil, whether by methods of persua-
sion or other means of pressure. They did not conceal their opinion 
that it would be necessary to resort to acts of violence in order to 
cause the exodus of many Palestinian refugees from Lebanon.42 
The Commission also remarked that Bashir Jemayel had declared 
that he would eliminate the Palestinian "problem" when he be-
came president "even if that meant resorting to aberrant methods 
against the Palestinians in Lebanon."43 Even prior to the invasion 
of Lebanon, therefore, the intention of the Phalangist leaders in 
their alliance with Israel was to remove the Palestinians from Leb-
anon, by force if necessary. 
The Report found that when word of Bashir Jemayel's assassi-
nation reached Israel at approximately 11:00 P.M. on Tuesday, 
September 14, Prime Minister Begin, Minister of Defense Sharon 
and Chief of Staff Eitan decided that the IDF would enter West 
Beirut, without seeking a Cabinet resolution to that effect."" Chief 
of Staff Eitan testified that, at 8:30P.M. on September 14, he and 
Defense Minister Sharon agreed on the entry of the Phalangists 
into the Sabra and Shatilla camps, setting in motion the events 
that would ultimately culminate in the massacres there."5 The op-
erating order for the entry into West Beirut provided in part: "The 
refugee camps are not to be entered. Searching and mopping up 
the camps will be done by the Phalangists-Lebanese army."46 
The Report then reached its most widely questioned finding: 
The [Israeli] forward command post was located on the roof of a 
five-story building about 200 meters southwest of the Shatilla camp. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 5. There was no prior consultation with the Cabinet; Foreign Minister 
Shamir was the only minister informed of this decision, which he endorsed. SABRA AND SHA-
TILLA, supra note 22, at 14. In apparent contradiction, the Commission stated that no claim 
could be made that this decision was adopted by Begin and Sharon without convening a 
cabinet session. The Commission further concluded that no indirect responsibiltiy for the 
massacres could be predicated on this decision because of the "extraordinary emergency 
situation" created by Bashir Jemayel's assassination. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 13. 
The Lebanese army, it stated, could not have enforced order in all of West Beirut. I d. For a 
discussion of Israel's entry into West Beirut as a violation of the PLO evacuation agreement, 
see infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
45. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. The Commission concluded that Sharon and 
Eitan did not consult with Begin in reaching their decision. Id. 
46. Id. 
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The two camps were essentially residential neighborhoods contain-
ing, in the area entered by the Phalangists . . . low permanent 
structures along narrow alleys and streets. From the roof of the for-
ward command post it was possible to see the area of the camps 
but-as all the witnesses who visited the roof of the command post 
stated, and these were a good number of witnesses whose word we 
consider reliable-it was impossible to see what was happening 
within the alleys in the camp from the roof of the command post, 
not even with the aid of 20 x 120 binoculars that were on the com-
mand post roof.47 
That finding, so crucial to the Report's approach and so soundly 
rejected by most authorities, is a regrettable weakness in the Re-
port that to a large extent undermines its fundamental premises 
and validity. 
Factual clarity is rarely a hallmark of international disputes 
and the massacres in Sabra and Shatilla are no exception. The 
purpose of this article is not to make independent factual findings, 
but rather to provide a framework for evaluating responsibility for 
such atrocities under international law and to apply that frame-
work by way of example to the massacres in Sabra and Shatilla. 
Yet achieving that purpose (and keeping in mind that the facts of 
most international conflicts are disputed) requires evaluating with 
care the most controversial factual finding in the Report because 
the accuracy of that finding has a substantial bearing on determi-
nations of responsibility under international law. 
Jonathan Randal, senior foreign correspondent for the Wash-
ington Post, noted:"ln its only obviously wrongheaded factual er-
ror, the Kahan Report insisted Israeli troops couldn't see into the 
camp's alleyways, even with giant telescopes on the command post 
roof. Journalists who climbed the seven-story building had no such 
difficulty with their own naked eyes."48 In Sabra and Shatilla: In-
quiry Into a Massacre, Israeli journalist Amnon Kapeliouk dis-
credited this "serious mistake" based on his own visits to the site.49 
He says that a mass grave dug by the Phalangists southwest of 
Shatilla, 300 meters from the roof, was clearly visible. The bulldoz-
ers allegedly used to bury hundreds of victims were also within 
view. Kapeliouk quotes the military correspondents of Yedi'ot 
Aharonot, an Israeli newspaper, as saying that the Israeli army 
could not see what was happening "under their nose" but knew 
47. Id. (emphasis added). 
48. J. RANDAL, supra note 35, at 20. 
49. SABRA AND SHATILLA, supra note 22, at 81-82. 
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"the exact street, building and floor in Beirut on which every 
Fedayeen leader lived; and knew the exact thickness of the walls 
around the Baghdad nuclear reactor."110 A New York Times article 
matter-of-factly remarked that from the rooftop of the Israeli ob-
servation post one could look down into the Shatilla camp.51 This 
same article noted that from the Israeli observation posts "it would 
not have been difficult to ascertain [what was happening in the 
camps] not only by sight but from the sounds of gunfire and the 
screams coming from the camp."112 A radio report by Loren Jenkins 
(the Washington Post Beirut correspondent) transcribed from the 
September 20, 1982, "All Things Considered" program on National 
Public Radio, perhaps best summarized the opinion of eyewit-
nesses as to visibility into the camps, particularly Shatilla. Jenkins 
responded to the question, "Do you have any doubt now of the 
complicity of the Israeli Defense Forces there?" as follows: 
There is no doubt in my mind that Israel aided and abetted that 
whole operation! . . . The final proof to me was when I walked and 
found what was a mass grave in a part of the camp, that when you 
stand just on top of that, and you raise your head, and you look up 
at a seven story building, about 300 yards away, which is the Israeli 
army's main observation post, a place where before their own ad-
vance into the city, they had set up giant telescopes for spotting 
snipers. And as I stood there Saturday morning looking up, there 
were six Israelis looking straight down at me. They stood and 
watched throughout this whole horrible tragedy as people were 
brought here, shot, dumped in this grave and packed up!113 
Shortly before 6:00 A.M. on September 15, 1982, the IDF be-
gan to enter West Beirut. Between 8:00 A.M. and 9:00 A.M. that 
50. Id. at 84. 
51. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, at A9, col. 2. 
52. I d. In his own testimony, Yaron stated that the observation posts were not "good 
in visibility," but "you could hear noises" and sometimes "human voices" from them. N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 8, 1982, at A4, col. 2. The Report, to buttress its weakest finding that the Israeli 
soldiers could not see the massacres from the command post, stated that the doctors and 
nurses in the Ga2a Hospital were not even aware a massacre was taking place. Yet the New 
York Times reported that doctors and nurses testified they heard constant shooting and 
shelling from Shatilla beginning Thursday and received the "first signal" that a massacre 
might be taking place Thursday evening when an eleven-year-old boy brought in with three 
gunshot wounds described how the militiamen shot his mother, father and three siblings in 
front of him. That evening they described the hospital as filled with Palestinians crying 
"We're going to die, wee going to die." N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A6, cols. 3-4. "By 
Friday afternoon it was clear to everyone in the hospital that they were in danger of being 
caught up in a massacre." Id., col. 5. 
53. Interview with Loren Jenkins, Washington Post Beirut correspondent, tran-
scribed from All Things Considered, broadcast on National Public Radio (Sept. 20, 1982). 
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same day, Defense "Minister Sharon met at the forward command 
post with Chief of Staff Eitan who reported on his agreement with 
the Phalangists for their entry into the camps.114 Sharon approved 
the agreement and telephoned Prime Minister Begin from the roof 
of the command post, yet according to the Report, Sharon in-
formed Begin only that there was no resistance in Beirut and that 
the operations were going well.1111 Also present on the forward com-
mand post were the Defense Minister's aide A vi Duda'i, the Direc-
tor of Military Intelligence Yehoshua Saguy, a representative of 
the Mossad, Major General Drori, and Brigadier General Y aron, 
among others. Duda'i's notes of the meeting stated that the 
Phalangists were to be sent into the camps and that Sharon had 
spoken twice with the Prime Minister from the roof of the com-
mand post.116 A document signed by Duda'i was issued later by the 
Defense Minister's office that summarized Sharon's instructions in 
two crucial, controversial sentences: "Only one element, and that is 
the IDF, shall command the forces in the area. For the operation 
in the camps the Phalangists should be sent in. "117 
At 11:30 A.M., the Israeli Prime Minister met with Morris 
Draper and other officials from the American embassy in Israel. 
Begin informed Draper that 
I.D.F. forces had entered West Beirut beginning in the morning 
hours, that there were no real clashes, that the I.D.F. action was 
undertaken in order to prevent certain possible events, and that we 
were concerned that there might be bloodshed even during the 
night. The Prime Minister also said that the Phalangists were be-
54. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. Sometime in the evening between September 
14 and September 15, Chief of Staff Eitan met in Beirut with Major General Drori and with 
the commander of the IDF division. At 3:30 A.M. on September 15, Chief of Staff Eitan 
went to the Phalangists' headquarters and, according to his own testimony, "ordered the 
Phalangist commanders to effect a general mobilization of all their forces, impose a general 
curfew on all the areas under their control, and be ready to take part in the fighting." The 
Phalangist commanders asked for twenty-four hours to prepare. Eitan then asked that a 
Phalangist liaison officer come to the Israeli division's forward command post. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. I d. at 6. The document was issued on September 16, and was directed to Chief of 
Staff Eitan, the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Director of Military Intelligence. Id. The 
witnesses were in disagreement as to whether this instruction signified that the Phalangist 
forces were to be directly under the command of the IDF. The Chief of Staff testified that 
he interpreted the instruction to mean the IDF, and no other Israeli element, was to com-
mand the forces in the area, but that did not mean the Phalangists were "under" the com-
mand of the IDF. However, the Director of Military Intelligence interpreted the instruction 
as meaning "that all forces operating in the area, including the Phalangists, will be under 
the authority of the I.D.F. and will act according to its instructions." Id. 
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having properly: their commander had not been injured in the assas-
sination and was in control of his forces; he is a good man and we 
trust him not to cause any clashes, but there is no assurance regard-
ing other forces. He added that the primary immediate task was to 
preserve quiet, for as long as quiet is maintained it will be possible 
to talk; otherwise there might have been pogroms, and the calm was 
preserved for the time being.'58 
This conversation, particularly Begin's references to the possibility 
of "pogroms," was a significant factor in the Commission's conclu-
sion that Begin was aware of the volatility of the Phalangists and 
their penchant toward mass retribution. 69 At 6:00 P.M. Sharon 
spoke with Prime Minister Begin from his home, reported that 
"everything is in order" and reconfirmed his approval of the deci-
sion the previous night to enter West Beirut.60 Also on the evening 
of September 15, Major General Drori met with the Phalangists 
and told them that they should enter the camps from the direction 
of Shatilla, which they did the following day. 61 Drori, whom the 
Report describes as "not at ease with the plan to send the 
Phalangists into the camps," earlier had failed to persuade the 
Lebanese army to enter the camps rather than the Phalangists. 62 
On Thursday, September 16, 1982, Chief of Staff Eitan re-
turned to Tel Aviv in the early morning hours. He met at 10:00 
A.M. with Sharon, the Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier 
General Saguy and Mr. Duda'i, among others, and announced: 
"[T]he whole city is in our hands, complete quiet prevails now, the 
camps are closed and surrounded, the Phalangists are to go in at 
11:00-12:00. Yesterday we spoke to them .... The situation now 
is that the entire city is in our hands, the camps are all closed."63 
Specifically referring to a map, Eitan stated that the Sabra and 
Shatilla camps were surrounded by IDF forces and that it was 
agreed the Phalangists would go in after a coordinating session 
with the Israeli o:fficials.64 Sharon stated he "would send" the 
58. !d. at 5. 
59. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
60. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. According to the Report, there was no discus-
sion of authorizing the Phalangists to enter the camps. ld. at 14. 
61. !d. at 5. 
62. ld. Mter the massacre, Drori stated in an interview on Israeli television that he 
"begged him [the Lebanese army's deputy chief] in every language possible to take responsi-
bility for the security situation in the camps •... "N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A10, col. 
3. 
63. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasis added). 
64. !d. 
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Phalangists into the refugee camps. 65 During the consultation, 
Sharon telephoned Prime Minister Begin and informed him: 
[T]he fighting has ended. The refugee camps are surrounded. The 
firing has stopped. We have not suffered any more casualties. Every-
thing is calm and quiet. Sitting opposite me is the Chief of Staff, 
who has just come from there [West Beirut]. All the key points are 
in our hands. Everything's over. That's the situation as of now 
66 
The first coordinating session for the Phalangists' entry into 
the camps was held at 11:00 A.M. on the sixteenth. Unnamed 
Phalangist commanders met with Major General Drori at the 
headquarters of one of the divisions. They agreed that a company 
of 150 fighters from the Phalangist force would enter the camps 
and coordinate their entry with Bridagier General Y aron on Thurs-
day afternoon at the forward command post.67 Yaron, apparently 
still apprehensive about the Phalangists' involvement, discussed 
with them purported terrorist locations in the camp and warned 
the Phalangist commanders not to harm the civilian population. 68 
The Report then noted the safety checks on the Phalangists re-
quired by Y aron. Y aron set up lookout posts on the roof of the 
forward command post and on a nearby roof "even though he 
knew that it was impossible to see very much of what was going on 
in the camps from these lookouts. "69 An additional measure not 
specified in the Report and described only in the classified Appen-
dix B to the Reporj; was imposed to ascertain the actions of the 
Phalangist forces in the camps.70 Yaron and the Phalangists also 
stipulated that a Phalangist liaison officer with a "communications 
set" would be present at all times on the roof of the forward com-
mand post with a Mossad liaison officer at the Phalangist 
headquarters. 71 
The Phalangist intelligence unit headed by Elie Hobeika72 was 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
67. Id.; but see M. JANSEN, supra note 16, at 102 (stating that 1000-1200 militiamen 
"seem to have been involved, with about half of them actually in the area at any one time"). 




72. Id. Hobeika reportedly was the liaison between the Phalangists and the Mossad, 
and also between the Phalangists and the United States embassy in Beirut. Bashir Jemayel 
and Hobeika reportedly had regular contracts with the Central Intelligence Agency. N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at A10, col. 6. According to the New York Times, Hobeika also led 
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assigned to enter the camps. According to the Commission, this 
unit was selected because the Phalangists had difficulty recruiting 
another appropriate force and the unit was considered to be spe-
cially trained in discovering terrorists. 73 The actors were chosen 
and the stage was set; the tragedy was about to begin. 
At approximately 6:00P.M. on Thursday, September 16, the 
Phalangists entered the camps, initially entering the Shatilla camp 
from the west and southwest.74 Hobeika himself did not enter the 
camps but remained on the roof of the Israeli forward command 
post throughout the night of the sixteenth.76 The Phalangists en-
tered in two groups and, according to the Commission, their move-
ments within the camps were not visible from the roof of the for-
ward command post or from the observation sites on other roofs.76 
In response to a request from "G," the Phalangists' liaison officer 
to the IDF, the IDF provided mortar, and subsequently aircraft, 
illumination for the Phalangists in the camps throughout the 
night.77 
Based primarily on these findings, the Commission concluded 
that Begin, Sharon, Eitan, Saguy and the head of the Mossad knew 
or should have known that a massacre was likely to result and were 
responsible to varying degrees for the massacres because they 
failed to take any action to prevent the Phalangists from entering 
the camps. In the Commission's opinion, however, individual re-
sponsibility for the massacres did not end with the failure to take 
the Tel Zaatar massacre. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, at A6, cols. 5-6. 
73. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
74. !d. Other sources have since placed the exact time at 5:15P.M. See, e.g., SABRA 
AND SHATILLA, supra note 22, at 30. The Report at this point in its analysis, in a marked 
departure from its generally unemotional tone, stated that there were "armed terrorist 
forces" in the camps whose extent they could not establish but whose arms were being used 
against the IDF. As noted in the Report, these hidden arms and terrorists never material-
ized. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7. The Commission concluded that this terrorist 
force had not been evacuated for two reasons: to renew underground terrorist activity at a 
later period and to protect the civilian population that had remained in the camps because, 
given the hostility prevailing between the various sects and organizations, a population 
without armed protection was in danger of massacre. In a clear jab at the United States' 
failure to provide protection for the civilian population, the Commission added that during 
the evacuation negotiations, a "guarantee for the safety of the Muslims in West Beirut was 
given by the representative of the United States who conducted the negotiations, following 
assurances received from the government of Israel and from Lebanon." See infra note 218 
and accompanying text. The author has purposely refrained from use of the term "terrorist" 
because it tends to be an inflammatory, meaningless term, particularly in the context of 
circular violence and retaliation in the Mideast. 
75. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
76. Id. 
77. !d.; see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A6, col. 4. 
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preventive action. From the Phalangists' entry into the camps un· 
til they left the following Saturday morning, numerous Israeli of· 
ficers and officials received reports of killings in the camps but 
failed to take steps to curtail the massacres. Among those receiving 
such reports were Sharon, Shamir, Eitan, Saguy, Drori and Y aron. 
In one of the many ironies of this tragedy, as the first reports 
of the massacres were arriving at the Israeli command post in Bei· 
rut on Thursday, September 16, the Israeli Cabinet was meeting in 
Israel to discuss the situation in Lebanon after Jemayel's assassi· 
nation.78 Attending the meeting were the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet Ministers, the Chief of Staff, the head of Mossad and the 
Director of Military Intelligence. Chief of Staff Eitan, describing 
his meetings with Phalangist personnel, said that he had told the 
Phalangist commanders to go in when they were told, that early 
that evening the Phalangists would begin fighting in Sabra, and 
that the Phalangists would go in there "with their own methods. "79 
He described the camps as surrounded "by us," reiterated that the 
Phalangists would begin to "operate" that night in the camps, and 
said that "we could give them [the Phalangists] orders" whereas 
the Lebanese army was less malleable. 80 
In a horrifying foreshadowing of the tragedy to come, the 
Chief of Staff addressed the possible consequences of Bashir 
Jemayel's assassination: 
A . . . thing that will happen-and it makes no difference whether 
we are there or not-is an eruption of revenge which, I do not know, 
I can imagine how it will begin but I do not know how it will end. It 
will be between all of them, and neither the Americans nor anyone 
else will be of any help. We can cut it down, but today they already 
killed.Druze there. What difference does it make who or what? They 
have already killed them, and one dead Druze is enough so that to-
morrow four Christian children will be killed; they will :find them 
slaughtered, just like what happened a month ago; and that is how it 
will begin, if we are not there-it will be an eruption the likes of 
which has never been seen; I can already see in their eyes what they 
are waiting for. 
Yesterday afternoon a group of Phalangist officers came, they 
were stunned, still stunned, and they still cannot conceive to them-
selves how their hope was destroyed in one blow, a hope for which 
78. KAHAN REPORT, .supra note 1, at 7. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. After the massacres, Eitan told reporters: "We do not give the Phalangists 
orders and we are not responsible for them. The Phalangist are Lebanese and Lebanon is 
theirs and they act as they see fit." N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1983, at A6, col. 3. 
No.2] KAHAN REPORT 391 
they built and sacrificed so much; and now they have just one thing 
left to do, and that is revenge, and it will be terrible.81 
In response to further questions, Eitan said he had told United 
States Ambassador Morris Draper that during Bashir Jemayel's fu-
neral Amin Jemayel had said "revenge," which Eitan said would 
result in "a war that no one will be able to stop."82 The head of 
Mossad then gave a briefing on the situation after Jemayel's assas-
sination, but made no reference in the meeting to the Phalangists' 
entry into the camps. 83 
The only person to question the Phalangists' entry into the 
camps even after Eitan had spoken was Deputy Prime Minister 
Levy who prophetically warned: 
[W]e would come out with no credibility when I heard that the 
Phalangists are already entering a certain neighborhood-and I 
know what the meaning of revenge is for them, what kind of slaugh-
ter. Then no one will believe we went in to create order there, and 
we will bear the blame. Therefore I think that we are liable here to 
get into a situation in which we will be blamed, and our explanation 
will not stand up . . . . 8 ' 
No one responded to his expression of concern. The Cabinet pro-
ceeded to adopt a resolution that attributed the entry into West 
Beirut in part to the continued presence in Beirut of "some 2000 
terrorists, equipped with modern and heavy weapons . . . in fla-
grant violation of the evacuation agreement .... "815 
Despite early reports of indiscriminate killings, the Report 
finds that the first Israeli attempt to curb the Phalangists did not 
occur until an 11:00 A.M. meeting on Friday, September 17, be-
tween Brigadier General Yaron and Major General Drori.86 Al-
though their testimony differed sharply as to what took place in 
that meeting, the Report concluded that an order to halt was con-
veyed to the Phalangist commanders. 87 At this same meeting, 
Drori telephoned Eitan, told him that the Phalangists had perhaps 
"gone too far," and that he had ordered the operation halted.88 
At 4:00 P.M. that same day Eitan, Y aron and Drori met with 
81. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. 
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the Phalangist staff at Phalangist headquarters. In this meeting, 
despite Drori's earlier order halting the Phalangists and report on 
their actions, Eitan "expressed his positive impression received 
from the statement by the Phalangist forces and their behavior in 
the field" and ordered that they "continue action, mopping up the 
empty camps south of Fakhani until tomorrow [Saturday] at 5:00 
A.M., at which time they must stop their action due to American 
pressure. There is a chance that the Lebanese army will enter in-
stead of them. "89 Eitan further testified that the Phalangists told 
him that "everything was alright, that the Americans are pressur-
ing them to leave and they would leave by 5:00A.M ..... "90 He 
did not ask the Phalangists any questions or debrief them about 
what had happened in the camps although he did refuse to permit 
them to send in more forces. Yaron, however, testified that no re-
strict~ons were placed on the Phalangists bringing in additional 
forces.91 
During the meeting the Phalangists requested a tractor "to de-
molish illegal structures."92 At the end of the meeting, as Brigadier 
General Y aron testified, it was "clear" that "the Phalangists could 
still enter the camps, bring in tractors and do what they wanted 
•• "
93 The Phalangists purportedly returned the one tractor 
89. Id . at 9. This order is not the only controversial directive issued by Eitan. In a 
January 22, 1983, Philadelphia Inquirer article, it was reported that nine Israeli soldiers on 
trial for mistreating Arab detainees submitted to the court a memorandum issued by Eitan 
ordering harsh treatment of Palestinian demonstrators. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINA-
TION CoMMITI'EE, THE BITI'ER YEAR 21 (1983) [hereinafter cited as THE BITI'ER YEAR]. Ac-
cording to the Jerusalem Post, Eitan used the military slang term "tirtur" (harassment or 
bullying) to describe treatments to be given detainees. Jerusalem Post, Jan. 30-Feb. 5, 
1983, at 4, col. 2 (lnt'l ed.). Eitan stated when the massacres first came to light that the 
Phalangists had entered the camps unbeknownst to the Israelis. Jerusalem Post, Sept. 22, 
1982, at 1, col. 2. 
90. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 9; N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A10, col. 4. An 
unanswered question raised by this part of the Report is what knowledge United States 
officials had at this time that would cause them to bring "pressure" to bear on the 
Phalangists to halt their operations. When asked for additional details of that aspect of the 
discussion, Major General Drori said he could not recall any details. KAHAN REPORT, supra 
note 1, at 9. The New York Times reported that at 9:00 A.M. on Saturday a member of the 
United States embassy staff entered Shatilla, established that a massacre had taken place 
and informed his superiors. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, at A1, col. 5. Even earlier, according 
to that same article, a group of American journalists spoke with a member of the American 
embassy staff Friday around 3:00 P.M. and mentioned the rumors they h~d heard that the 
Phalangists had entered Shatilla. The charge d'affaires was immediately alerted and con-
tacted Amin Jemayel, who said he would check on the report. For a discussion of the extent 
of American knowledge and responsibility, see infra notes 220-42 and accompanying text. 
91. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
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supplied shortly after they received it .since they had their own 
tractors that they used (in large part to pile up the bodies)94 that 
night and the following morning.95 In the most appalling lack of 
concern over the situation in the camps, no question was addressed 
to the Phalangist commanders about any of the rumors or reports 
of killing and mistreatment of the civilians in the camps. 96 
Between 8:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. on Friday, September 17, 
Chief of Staff Eitan returned to Israel and telephoned the Defense 
Minister to update him on the situation in Beirut. The versions of 
this conversation in Sharon's testimony and Eitan's testimony dif-
fer substantially. Eitan testified that the Phalangists had carried 
out their operation and had stopped, and that they would leave by 
5:00A.M. Saturday due to pressure from the United States.97 He 
testified that he did not mention disorderly behavior by the 
Phalangists, massacres or "killing beyond what had been ex-
pected."96 In contrast, Sharon testified that Eitan had informed 
him that "the Christians had harmed the civilian population more 
than was expected. "99 He further testified that the Chief of Staff 
"used the expression that the Lebanese Forces had 'gone too far,' 
and that therefore their activity had been stopped in the after-
noon, the entry of additional forces had been prevented, and an 
order had been given to the Phalangists to remove their forces 
from the camps by 5:00 A.M. the following morning. "100 Sharon 
said that Eitan also mentioned that civilians had been killed; 
Sharon claimed that was the first report of "irregular activity" to 
reach him.101 The Commission credited Sharon's version of the 
telephone conversation, concluding that from this point on the De-
fense Minister knew that killings of civilians had been carried out 
in the camps.102 At 10:00 P.M. that evening Sharon also received 
from foreign ministry personnel a summary of complaints lodged 
that evening by unidentified United States representatives about 
the entry of the Phalangists and its potential consequences.103 Fi-
nally, at 11:30 P.M., Mr. Ben Yishai called Sharon and told him of 
94. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, at All, col. 5. 








103. Id. See also infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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the reports he had heard that "the Phalangists were doing unac-
ceptable things in the camps. "104 Sharon did not react-by this 
time such reports were no longer news to him. 
The Phalangists did not leave the camps at 5:00 A.M. Satur-
day, September 18, as ordered. When Brigadier General Yaron 
learned of this at 6:30 A.M., he gave the Phalangist commander on 
the scene the long-needed order-that they must vacate the camps 
"without delay"-and the last of the Phalangists left the camps at 
approximately 8:00 A.M.105 
Testimony before the Commission revealed that a telephone 
conversation took place between Chief of Staff Eitan and Prime 
Minister Begin sometime in the morning or early afternoon on Sat-
urday. The Prime Minister testified he was in a synagogue for 
Rosh Hashanah from 8:00A.M. to 1:15 or 1:30 P.M.106 In his first 
appearance before the. Commission, Eitan testified that at about 
10:00 A.M. Prime Minister Begin had telephoned to tell him that 
the Americans were complaining the Phalangists had entered Gaza 
Hospital and were killing patients.107 At Eitan's order the com-
plaints were investigated, but it was concluded there were no such 
killings and he so informed the Prime Minister. When the Com-
mission pointed out Begin's testimony as to his attendance at the 
synagogue, Eitan said the telephone call must have taken place 
earlier in the morning.108 Begin denied the call altogether, as well 
as any American call to him about Gaza Hospital.109 Sharon, how-
ever, testified that Eitan spoke with him by telephone between 
9:00 A.M. and 10:00 A.M. and told him (Sharon) that Begin had 
called his attention to "some occurrence at Gaza Hospital."110 In 
an inexcusable failure to resolve these crucial conflicts in what Be-
gin knew and when, the Report concluded there is "no need, for 
the purpose of determining the facts in this investigation," to de-
cide between the conflicting versions.m 
104. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 






111. Id. Although not mentioned in the Report, Lieutenant Colonel Ze'ev Zecharin, 
the director of Eitan's office, also testified that Eitan called him at 10:30 A.M. and told him 
that he had spoken to Begin that morning, and Begin had questioned him about what hap-
pened in Gaza Hospital. FOIA DocUMENT, supra note 1, No. 341, Dep't of State Telegram. 
It remains unclear not only when Begin learned of the massacres but also whether Begin 
and Sharon planned the entry into Beirut-specifically West Beirut-from the very incep-
No.2] KAHAN REPORT 395 
That same morning, Sharon received additional complaints 
about the slaughter. The Director General of the Foreign Ministry, 
Mr. Kimche, told Sharon that United States Ambassador Draper 
had informed him the IDF soldiers had entered banks in Beirut 
and that Palestinians had been massacred.112 The Defense Minis-
ter's reply, given at approximately 1:00 P.M., was that the 
Phalangists' operation had been stopped and their forces expelled 
from the camps.113 At 3:00 .p.M. Drori told Sharon about the re-
ports of the massacre (the Report does not specify which reports), 
that the Phalangists had left the camps and that the press and 
Red Cross were inside the camps.114 At 5:00 P.M. Drori appealed to 
the Lebanese army to enter the camps, which it finally did the fol-
lowing day.115 
Having failed to address Begin's knowledge of trouble in the 
camps earlier Saturday, the Report noted only that the Prime 
Minister "heard about the massacre" on a BBC radio broadcast 
that evening, at which point he contacted the Chief of Staff and 
Defense Minister.116 The Report acknowledged that it was "osten-
sibly puzzling" that the Defense Minister did not inform Begin of 
the Phalangists' entry into the camps, and that Begin knew noth-
ing of the plan until the Cabinet meeting on the sixteenth.117 
tion of the invasion. Salpeter, The Inquiry Begins: Placing the Blame on Israel, 19 THE 
NEw LEADER 3-4 (Oct. 18, 1982). 
112. KAHAN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 10; see infra note 222. Bruce Kashdan from the 
Foreign Ministry also testified that Saturday at 10:00 A.M., Draper called him with the 
following message for Sharon: "You must stop the massacres. They are obscene. I have an 
officer in the camp counting the bodies. You ought to be ashamed. The situation is rotten 
and terrible. They are killing children. You are in absolute control of the area, and therefore 
responsible for that area."FOIA DocuMENT, supra note 1, Dep't of State Incoming Tele-
gram. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text. 




117. Id. at 15. At 9:00P.M. on Sunday, September 19, a Cabinet meeting took place 
with the additional participation of Eitan, the head of the Massad, Saguy, Drori and other 
unnamed individuals. In the course of that meeting, Eitan stated: 
On Friday, I met with them [the Phalangists] at around noon, at their command post. 
We did not yet know what had happened there. In the morning we knew that they 
had killed civilians so we ordered them to get out and we did not allow others to 
enter. But they did not say they had killed civilians, and they did not say how many 
civilians they had killed; they did not say anything • • . • 
Eitan explained in his testimony that the knowledge of killings "[i]n the morning referred to 
Saturday, not Friday morning." The Commission accepted his explanation. In the course of 
the meeting and the subsequent testimony, Begin confirmed that on the fourteenth of Sep-
tember when the decision to enter West Beirut was made, he had spoken to Eitan about 
protecting "the Muslims from the vengeance of the Phalangists," demonstrating their cogni-
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In all likelihood, it will never be known exactly who or how 
many were killed in the massacres. The official Red Cross burial of 
the dead counted 328 bodies, including Palestinians, Lebanese, 
Iranians, Syrians, Pakistanis and Algerians.118 Some survivors bur-
ied their less fortunate family members.U9 Truckloads of bodies 
were removed by the Phalangists, and still other bodies are be-
lieved to remain under the ruins or in mass graves dug by the 
Phalangists.120 The IDF estimates 700 to 800 were killed.121 There 
have been estimates that approximately a thousand were killed122 
and over 900 people put into trucks and driven away.123 One Israeli 
source put the total number of civilians killed at 3000.124 
IV. THE REPORT'S DELINEATION OF "DIRECT" AND "INDIRECT" 
RESPONSffiiLITY FOR THE MASSACRES 
The Commission of Inquiry of Law of 1968 provides no stan-
dards by which a commission can determine responsibility for the 
acts it is required to investigate. The Kahan Commission devised 
two levels of responsibility-direct and indirect-and its concep-
tion of the differences between the two muted Israel's responsibih 
ity. According to the Commission, only those who "actually perpe-
trated" the massacre itself were directly responsible.125 Therefore, 
it was a relatively simple matter for the Commission to determine 
zance of the danger even at that point in time. The Commission concluded that it could not 
determine "with certainty" what Begin had said at that time on this point. The meeting 
resulted in a resolution expressing regret at the massacre "at a place distant from an I.D.F. 
position," and concluding: "No one will preach to us moral values or respect for human life, 
on whose basis we were educated and will continue to educate generations of fighters in 
Israel." Id. at 10-11. 
11S. Id. at 10. Of the 32S estimated dead according to the Red Cross, 45 were Leba-
nese, 21 Iranians, 10 Syrians, 13 Pakistanis and 2 Algerians. FOIA DocUMENT, supra note 1, 
No. 320, Dep't of State Incoming Telegram. 
119. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 19S2, at AS, col. 2. 
120. KAHAN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 10; see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 19S2, at AS, 
col. 3. 
121. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. 
122. The Times (London), Sept. 24, 19S2, at 6, col. 2. 
123. For example, at 1:00 P.M. on Friday a reporter for Danish television watched as a 
cattle truck at the southern gate of Shatilla was loaded with women and children from the 
camp by Christian militiamen. What happened to them is unknown. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 
19S2, at A6, col. 4. Individual or mass forcible transfers of civilians from occupied territory 
to any territory of any country is prohibited, regardless of motive, under article 49(1) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 2S7 [here-
inafter cited as Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
124. SABRA AND SHATILLA, supra note 22, at 63. 
125. KAHAN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 11. 
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that Israel and those acting on its behalf were not directly respon-
sible for the massacres. The Report concluded that "the atrocities 
in the refugee camps were perpetrated by . . . the Phalangists, and 
that absolutely no direct responsibility devolves upon Israel or 
upon those who acted in its behalf."126 In reaching this conclusion 
the Commission determined: (1) No other military force was seen 
in the area of the camps at the time of the Phalangists' entrance 
into or exit from this area;127 (2) Major Haddad's forces were not 
involved because (a) no unit of that force had crossed the Awali 
that week, (b) the relations between the Phalangists and Haddad's 
forces were too poor for such cooperation/28 (c) Haddad's arrival 
126. Id. at 13. 
127. The Commission said that it could be "stated with certainty that no organized 
military force entered the camps ... besides the Phalangist forces." Id. at 11. The testi-
mony suggesting the contrary was that of the doctors and nurse taken captive by the 
Phalangists from the Gaza Hospital. The nurse, Ellen Siegel, testified about a visit to the 
hospital at 7:00 P.M. on Friday, the seventeenth, by two men in civilian clothes speaking 
German, which she "hinted" were Sephardic Jews. Id. The Commission quickly dismissed 
the possibility, attributing it to the nurse's "tendentiousness." Id. Ellen Siegel is a Jewish 
American nurse who had volunteered in July to serve in Beirut and had traveled to the 
Middle East under the auspices of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 
Inc. For a full account of her story, see McDonnell, Sabra: An Eyewitness Account, THE 
MIDDLE EAST Nov. 1982, at 29. A British doctor from the hospital, Dr. Paul Morris, sup-
ported Ms. Siegel's testimony as to the Germanic accents. FOIA DocUMENT, supra note 1, 
Account by British doctor Paul Morris. One of the doctors also saw soldiers with an "M.P." 
band on their uniforms, but according to the Report, some of the Phalangists wore such 
bands. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. 
According to one news report in Shatilla, reporters found boxes of M-16 shell cases 
printed in Hebrew, wrappings from Israeli chocolate wafers and remnants of United States 
army C-rations-perhaps evidence that some of the Phalangists were provided with food 
and ammunition by the Israelis. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, at A10, col. 6. Also, the Report 
does not mention statements by Palestinians in the camps that Israelis prevented them 
from leaving the camps during the massacres. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, at All, cols. 3-4. 
128. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. An article by Beirut correspondent Robert 
Fisk reported that Israeli C-130 aircraft transported some of Haddad's forces to Beirut on 
the day of the massacre. The Times (London), Sept. 21, 1982, at 1, col. 4. Survivors of the 
massacres testified that participants in the massacre had southern Lebanese accents and 
Moslem names. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. The Commission reasoned that this 
testimony was inconclusive because the Phalangist forces purportedly included 
Shi'ites-"albeit not many"-and persons who had fled from southern Lebanon. Id. Never-
theless, the Commission was unwilling to reject the possibility that men from Haddad's 
forces had joined in the massacre on their own prerogative. Id. at 11-12. As one source 
reported shortly after the massacres: 
As for the others [others than Phalangists participating in the massacre] the evidence 
points to their being members of the Christian militia of Major Haddad. All of the 
residents and doctors in the camps spoken to by reporters said both Haddad's men, 
in their uniforms, and Phalangists, joined in the operation. Officials have sought to 
place blame solely on the Phalangists since Major Haddad's militia is virtually inte-
grated into the Israeli army and operates entirely under its command. 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A6, col. 3. Haddad had said he did not have any men "offi-
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at the airport on Friday was unrelated to the massacres,129 (d) tes-
timony that some members of the Phalangists had Moslem names 
and southern Lebanese accents was untrustworthy;130 and (3) there 
was no reason to conclude IDF soldiers were in the camps based 
solely on a lost IDF dogtag found in the camp and the placement 
of cluster bombs as booby traps under the bodies.131 
cially" in Beirut. The Times (London), Sept. 23, 19S2, at 1, col. 3. 
129. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. Major Haddad arrived at Beirut at S:30 A.M. 
on Friday, September 17. He paid a condolence call to the Jemayel family, then went to 
visit relatives in Jouniyeh and returned that afternoon to his home in southern Lebanon. 
The Times (London), Sept. 23, 19S2, at 1, cols. 3-4. Haddad testified before the Commission 
and denied any involvement in the massacres. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1S, 19S2, at AS, cols. 1-3. 
130. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. 
131. A witness from the United States testified that a civilian identification and a 
military dogtag belonging to an IDF soldier were found in the Sabra camp. After further 
investigation, the Commission found that the soldier was in Tel Hashomer Hospital after 
sustaining wounds from the entry into West Beirut. The soldier gave testimony that when 
he was wounded, apparently on September 15, a medic cut off his vest containing his per-
sonal documents and threw it on the side of the road. I d. at 12. 
The same witness who testified about the lost IDF dogtag in the Sabra camp testified 
that he had heard that cluster bombs were placed under bodies as booby-traps against those 
trying to bury the dead. The Report states the witness "raised the question whether the 
Phalangists or the forces of Major Haddad-if any of them were in the camps-possessed 
the requisite technical skills to make use of these bombs as booby-traps." I d. The Commis-
sion found it "extremely far-fetched" that this testimony could be viewed as "containing 
anything concrete pointing to direct involvement of anyone from the I.D.F." in the mas-
sacres. Id. 
For many years Israel's use of cluster bombs, a horrifyingly inhumane weapon, has been 
a controversial issue in United States-Israeli relations. On July 23, 1952, the United States 
and Israel entered into a Mutual Defense Agreement that presently governs the conditions 
under which sales of military equipment to Israel are made. Israel Mutual Defense Assis-
tance Agreement, July 23, 1952, United States-Israel, 3 U.S.T. 49S5, T.I.A.S. No. 2675. The 
Agreement does not provide any sanctions; however, section 4 of the Arms Export Control 
Act of 1961, as amended, does provide for sanctions against countries in violation of military 
purchase agreements. 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (Supp. 1984). The sanctions include no foreign mili-
tary sales credits or loan guarantees, and no cash sales or deliveries pursuant to previous 
sales for "substantial" violations, "either in terms of quantities or in terms of gravity of the 
consequences regardless of the quantities involved," of any purchase agreement. Id. § 
2753(c)(1)(A). The President must report to Congress "promptly" on receipt of information 
that such a violation may have occurred. I d. § 2753(2). If the President determines a viola-
tion has occurred and so reports to Congress, or if Congress so deterniines by joint resolu-
tion, the sanctions are to be imposed. Id. § 2753(3)(A). 
Neither Congress nor the President has formally found Israel to be in violation of its 
military purchase agreement. Yet it is argued herein that the invasion of Lebanon was not 
an act of self-defense, and it was not pursuant to any United Nations collective security 
agreement under article 52 of the United Nations Charter. In the invasion, Israel used F -15 
and F-16 fighter-bomber aircraft, cluster bombs, phosphorus shells and artillery canisters 
supplied by the United States. THE BriTER YEAR, supra note S9, at 70. Israel confirmed that 
it had used cluster bombs in civilian areas in Lebanon. N.Y. Times, June 2S, 19S2, at AS, 
col. 6; N.Y. Times, July 19, 19S2, at A1, col. 5. · 
The cluster bomb is particularly controversial because of its devastating effects and the 
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As the Report acknowledged, if the Israeli officials planned 
and aided the Phalangists in the entry into the camps, and the 
Israeli officials knew or should have known that a massacre was 
likely to result and was occurring, then why was Israel not directly 
responsible? First, the Commission stated there was no direct re-
sponsibility because the Israeli officials did not allow the 
Phalangists to enter with the intent that a massacre take place or 
as part of a plan with the Phalangists for a massacre to take place; 
rather, the decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps was 
made to avoid additional casualties in the IDF forces and to ex-
ploit the Phalangists' expertise in identifying terrorists.132 Other 
strict restrictions on its use by the United States. On impact a cluster bomb sprays up to 
650 separate bomblets or grenades that themselves explode on impact. M JANSEN, supra 
note 16, at 32. Time described their effect as follows: "Because the bombs indiscriminately 
blast an area several hundred feet in diameter they are clearly unsuited for use in civilian 
neighborhoods." Smith, Leave West Beirut, TIME, July 12, 1982, at 36, quoted in M JANSEN, 
supra note 16, at 32. 
Three classified agreements specifically governing Israel's use of the cluster bomb have 
been enacted since 1978, each more stringent than the last. According to a New York Times 
article, in 1978 Israel agreed to use them only in combat "with two or more Arab states" and 
only "for defensive purposes." N.Y. Times, June 30, 1982, at A12, col. 3; THE BlTI'ER YEAR, 
supra note 89, at 74. Another newspaper reported that under the 1978 agreement cluster 
bombs were to be used only in levels of conflict equal to or exceeding the 1967 and 1973 
wars. L.A. Times, July 14, 1982, at 10, col. 3, cited in W. EsPINOSA & L. JANKA, DEFENSE OR 
AGGRESSION? U.S. ARMY EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AND THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON 16 
(1983). Even if it is conceded that Syria was involved in the fighting in Lebanon, Lebanon 
was allied with Israel, and Israel itself does not consider the PLO to be a state. An American 
commission of inquiry concluded that the bombs were used "indiscriminately" against the 
civilian population in at least fourteen locations in West Beirut. M. JANSEN, supra note 16, 
at 35. President Reagan blocked a consignment of 4000 cluster bomb shells in disapproval, 
but "the bureaucracy slipped up and the pipeline was never interrupted." J. RANDAL, supra 
note 35, at 211. As a result of President Reagan's renewed rapprochement with Israel, Presi-
dent Reagan ordered resumption of delivery of American-made cluster bombs to Israel in 
November of 1983. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1983, at A1, col. 6. For a detailed treatment of the 
issue of United States arms control laws applicable to Israel's invasion of Lebanon, see W. 
ESPINOSA & L. JANKA, supra this note. 
132. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 12: 
No intention existed on the part of any Israeli element to harm the non-combatant 
population in the camps. It is true that in the war in Lebanon, and particularly dur-
ing the siege of West Beirut, the civilian population sustained losses, with old people, 
women and children among the casualties, but this was the result of belligerent ac-
tions which claim victims even among those who do not fight. Before they entered the 
camps and also afterward, the Phalangists requested I.D.F. support in the form of 
artillery fire and tanks, but this request was rejected by the Chief of Staff in order to 
prevent injuries to civilians. It is true that I.D.F. tank fire was directed at sources of 
fire within the camps, but this was in reaction to fire directed at the I.D.F. from 
inside the camps. We assert that in having the Phalangists enter the camps, no inten-
tion existed on the part of anyone who acted on behalf of Israel to harm the non-
combatant population, and that the events that followed did not have the concur-
rence or assent of anyone from the political or civilian echelon who was active regard-
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sources have made a convincing argument that in fact there was a 
plan and intent that a massacre take place.133 Yet whether the Is-
raelis let in the Phalangists when they knew or should have known 
that a massacre would result, or let them in pursuant to a plan or 
with intent that a massacre take place, the result is the same under 
the tenets of international law to be discussed-Israel bears re-
sponsibility, without direct or indirect distinctions. 
Second, the Commission concluded that nothing was visiOle or 
audible from the roof of the forward command post to indicate a 
massacre was taking place; therefore, the only forces found to be 
directly responsible for the massacre were the Phalangists-not on 
the basis of orders prior to entry but on the basis of spontaneous 
acts of revenge subsequently approved on site by the Phalangist 
commanders. 134 
The Report did conclude that Israel was indirectly responsible 
for the massacres: 
[T]he decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee 
camps was taken without consideration of the danger-which the 
makers and executors of the decision were obligated to foresee as 
probable-that the Phalangists would commit massacres and 
pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps, and without an exam-
ination of the means for preventing this danger. Similarly, it is clear 
from the course of events that when the reports begin to arrive 
about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed 
was taken of these reports, the correct conclusions were not drawn 
from them, and no energetic and immediate actions were taken to 
restrain the Phalangists and put a stop to their actions. This both 
reflects and exhausts Israel's indirect responsibility for what oc-
curred in the refugee camps.l311 
ing the Phalangists' entry into the camps. 
I d. One article noted that the plan for the Phalangists to enter the camps "fit the objectives 
of [Sharon] who was reported early in the war to have hoped that the Phalangists, known 
for their ruthlessness, would go into West Beirut against the P.L.O., thereby sparing the 
Israeli army heavy casualties." N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at AS, cols. 4-5. 
133. In The Battle of Beirut, the author suggests that the massacres, if not their pre-
cise extent, may have been planned to promote an exodus of the Palestinians from Lebanon. 
M. JANSEN, supra note 16, at 107-09; see also infra notes 267-74 and accompanying text. 
Another source suggested that the underlying purpose of the invasion from its inception was 
to destroy the PLO in order to facilitate the annexation of the occupied territories. F. 
BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION AS AN APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST (1983). Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits annexation 
of any occupied territory by the occupying power. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 
123, art. 47. 
134. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
135. Id. 
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The Commission resisted any inquiry into the indirect respon-
sibility of parties other than Israel. Nevertheless, the Commission 
did suggest who else might be responsible. First mention was re-
served for the Lebanese army and the Lebanese government who 
had failed to respond affirmatively to the IDF's requests that they 
enter the camps.136 The Commission also examined documents re-
garding the United States' involvement, incorporated as Appendix 
B to the Report, which was not published "in the interest of pro-
tecting [Israel's] security or foreign relations."137 The Commis-
sion's projections as to future issues of the United States' involve-
ment are worth repeating: 
It should ... be noted that in meetings with U.S. representatives 
during the critical days, Israel's spokesmen repeatedly requested 
that the U.S. use its influence to get the Lebanese army to fulfill the 
function of maintaining public peace and order in West Beirut, but 
it does not seem that these requests had any result. One might also 
make charges concerning the hasty evacuation of the multinational 
force by the countries whose troops were in place until after the 
evacuation of the terrorists. We will also not discuss the question of 
when other elements besides Israeli elements first learned of the 
massacre, and whether they did all they could to stop it or at least 
to immediately bring the reports in their possession to Israeli and 
other elements.138 
V. RESPONSffiiLITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MAsSACRES 
OF CIVILIANS 
A. Israel's Responsibility as a Nation 
Shortly before its decision on Israel's indirect responsibility, 
the Report contains the only paragraph addressing the ramifica-
tions of its conclusions under international law: 
It is not our function as a commission of inquiry to lay a precise 
legal foundation for such indirect responsibility. It may be that from 
a legal perspective, the issue of responsibility is not unequivocal, in 
view of the lack of clarity regarding the status of the State of Israel 
and its forces in Lebanese territory. If the territory of West Beirut 
may be viewed at the time of the events as occupied territory-and 
we do not determine that such indeed is the case from a legal per-
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added). 
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spective-then it is the duty of the occupier, according to the rules 
of usual and customary international law, to do all it can to ensure 
the public's well-being and security.139 
The principle of international law to which the Commission 
referred is embodied in the Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land140 and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949.141 The Hague Convention, a multilateral 
treaty, was generally recognized as customary international law 
binding on all nations by the Nuremberg Tribunals and has been 
so recognized by the Supreme Court of Israel in the Elon Moreh 
case.142 Article 22 acknowledges that the right of belligerents to 
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. More impor-
tantly, article 43 requires an occupying power to take all measures 
in its power to restore and ensure public order and safety. The 
Convention expressly prohibits killing an enemy who surrendered 
at discretion or declaring that no quarter will be given.143 
Under the Hague Convention, territory is considered occupied 
when it is "actually placed" under the authority of the hostile 
army, the occupation extending only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.144 Although 
the Convention's narrow definition of occupation often limits its 
application, Israel's occupation of West Beirut satisfied this stan-
dard. Both Sharon and Eitan declared on September 16, 1982, 
before the massacres began, that all of Beirut was under Israeli 
control.145 Under article 3, a violation of the Convention and its 
regulations may render the violator, in this case Israel, liable to 
pay compensation. 
The principle of belligerent occupation is also embodied in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, relating to the status of the 
civilian population in areas under military occupation as a result of 
war .146 Israel is a signatory to the convention, having ratified it and 
139. Id. at 12. 
140. 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (1909-1911) [hereinafter cited as 1907 Hague 
Convention]. 
141. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123. 
142. Supreme Court Judgment with Regard to the Elon Moreh Settlement in the Oc-
cupied West Bank (Israel Oct. 22, 1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 148, 168 (1980). 
143. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 140, arts. 22, 43. 
144. Id. art. 42. 
145. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
146. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123. Civilians are usually defined as indi-
viduals who are not members of the armed forces and who do not participate in military 
operations. 8. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 55. 
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the three other Geneva conventions in 1951.147 Any "lack of clar-
ity" as to Israel's obligations as an occupying power in West Beirut 
cannot be attributed to ambiguities in the four conventions. They 
apply in "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Par-
ties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them," and 
to all cases of "partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party"148-a lesser control requirement for occupation 
than that of the Hague Convention. Thus even if Israel did not 
actually control all of Beirut, Israel was still responsible for the 
protection of civilians in West Beirut. 
The Fourth Geneva Convention does not necessarily protect 
all civilians in an occupied territory, but only those who are "in the 
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they 
are not nationals. "149 Although article 4 states that nationals of a 
state that is not bound by the Convention are not protected, that 
article must be read in conjunction with article 2, which states that 
a party is bound to observe the Convention in relation to a non-
party if the nonparty accepts and applies the Convention. Thus 
the civilians in the camps who were nationals of states that have 
ratified the Convention (that is, the Lebanese, Syrians, Iranians, 
Pakistanis and Algerians) would be "protected persons" under the 
Convention. And although the Palestinians are not nationals of a 
state bound by the Convention, under article 2 Israel would be 
bound to observe the Convention in relation to the PLO, which has 
accepted and applied the terms of the Convention. The commen-
tary to article 3 governing noninternational conflicts clarifies that a 
nonsignatory party need not be a state to bind others and to be 
bound by the Convention.1150 Moreover, the commentary to article 
147. SeeS. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 37-38. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention has almost as many parties as the United Nations Charter, including Lebanon, 
Israel, Syria and the United States. The PLO also has attempted to declare its adherence to 
the 1977 Geneva Protocol I concerning International Armed Conflicts that elaborate on the 
Fourth Geneva Convention's protection of civilians. I d. Israel is not a signatory to the Pro-
tocol and the Protocol has not yet come into effect. D. ScHINDLER & J. ToMAN, THE LAws OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 631 (1981). 
148. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, art. 2. 
149. I d. art. 4. The 1977 Protocol further clarifies that "[t]he presence within the civil-
ian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not 
deprive the population of its civilian character" and that stateless persons are protected 
persons within the meaning of the Fourth Convention. 1977 Protocol to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention arts. 50(3) & 73, reprinted in D. ScHINDLER & J. ToMAN, supra note 147, at 581, 
594. 
150. J. Pictet states: 
404 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1985: 373 
4 states that protected persons include persons in the occupied ter-
ritory "without any nationality" who "had fled from their home-
land and no longer considered themselves, or were no longer con-
sidered, to be nationals of that country.151 
Israel has contended that it is not an occupying power in Leb-
anon as defined by international law, on the grounds that it has 
not established a military government in the area and that its pres-
ence is temporary, although it has instructed its forces to follow 
the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.152 No interna-
tional legal authority agrees with its position. The United Nations, 
the International Committee on Human Rights in Lebanon and 
the United States all view Israel as a belligerent occupant of Leba-
non and therefore bound by the international law of occupation.153 
Indeed, on July 13, 1983, Israel's own High Court of Justice 
ruled in a case concerning the status of detainees Israel holds in 
Lebanon that the Geneva Conventions apply and that Israel is an 
occupying power in Lebanon. In Wahi v. Minister of Defense, the 
Israeli Supreme Court had to address the legal authority of the 
IDF to detain the petitioners, and those rules under international 
law governing the IDF's treatment of the detainees in Lebanon.154 
The words "each Party" mark the great progress which the passage of a few years had 
brought about in international law. Until recently it would have been considered im-
possible in law for an international Convention to bind a non-signatory Party-a 
Party, moreover, which was not yet in existence and which need not even represent a 
legal entity capable of undertaking international obligations. 
J. PICTET, COMMENTARY TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION 37 (1958). 
151. Id. at 47. 
152. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN LEBANON: TOWARD LEGAL ORDER AND 
RESPECT FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, 12 (Aug. 10, 1983) (available from the American Friends Ser-
vice Committee) [hereinafter cited as TowARD LEGAL ORDER]. 
153. Id. The United Nations Security Council passed three resolutions during the in-
vasion referring to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Convention of 1907 in 
calling on all parties to the conflict to protect the civilian population and in condemning 
Israel's blockade of Beirut: 37 U.N. SCOR (2380th mtg.), at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/512 (1982); 
37 U.N. SCOR (2382nd mtg.), at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/513 (1982); 37 U.N. SCOR (2385th 
mtg.), at 53-55, U.N. Doc. S/RES/515 (1982). On September 24, 1982, the United Nations 
General Assembly, with the exception of Israel and the United States, voted in favor of a 
resolution condemning the massacre and calling on the Security Council to investigate. Sev-
enth Emergency Session resumed Sept. 24, 1982, 37 U.N. GAOR, at 158-59, U.N. Doc. AI 
ES-7 /PV.32 (1982). On September 19, the Security Council had unanimously condemned 
the massacres. 37 U.N. SCOR (2396th mtg.) at 97-98, U.N. Doc. S/RES/521 (1982). 
154. Wahl v. Minister of Defense (Israel May 11, 1983) (copy on file with author). The 
treatment accorded to detainees in Lebanon and the number of persons detained became 
one of the more controversial aspects of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 
1983, at A18, col. 3. One source estimated that at least 7000 persons were still being de-
tained in southern Lebanon as of the final months of 1982 and cited an Amnesty Interna-
tional report on August 9, 1982, estimating that there were then 10,000 detainees in the 
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Rejecting the arguments advanced by the Israeli government and 
military authorities, the court concluded that both the Geneva 
Conventions and the Hague Convention of 1907 with its more nar-
row definition of occupied territories applied to Lebanese territory 
occupied by Israel, irrespective of the establishment of a special 
organizational status or the duration of the occupation. 
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that 
the civilian population must be protected, especially against all 
acts of violence or threats thereof. The third paragraph of that ar-
ticle prohibits "any adverse distinctions being made among pro-
tected persons and in particular those based on race, religion, or 
political opinion." Article 32 prohibits a High Contracting Party 
from causing "physical suffering or extermination of protected per-
sons" and article 33 prohibits reprisals against protected persons. 
Article 29 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that a party 
charged with protecting the civilian population is responsible for 
the treatment accorded to them by its "agents" without regard to 
any individual agent's responsibility. According to the Commis-
sion, the Phalangists entered the camps at the instigation of Israeli 
officials. Indeed, without Israel's acquiescence and support, the 
Phalangists' entry into the Israeli surrounded camps would have 
been impossible. The extent of Israeli control of the Phalangists is 
reflected in the testimony of Chief of Staff Eitan that on Septem-
ber 15 he "ordered the Phalangist commanders to effect a general 
mobilization of all their forces, impose a general curfew on all areas 
under their control, and be ready to take part in the fighting."~55 
Regardless of an intent or a plan with the Phalangists to effectuate 
a massacre, Israel is responsible under article 29 for the actions of 
the Phalangists as their agents in the camp. Moreover1. if we as-
sume, contrary to the finding of the Report, that Haddad's forces 
were also involved in the massacre, their involvement and alle-
giance to the Israeli command would independently and unques-
tionably render Israel liable for their actions in the camp.156 
Ansar prison. THE BITI'ER YEAR, supra note 89, at 26, 149. Four thousand five hundred of 
these Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners were released in November of 1983 in return for 
six Israelis held by the PLO. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1983, at A1, col. 3. For a detailed evalua-
tion of the human rights practices of Israel in occupied Lebanon from the Arab perspective, 
see THE BITI'ER YEAR, supra note 89. 
155. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 39, 128-29 & 135 and accompanying text. However, if only indi-
vidual members of Haddad's forces were involved, and Haddad neither knew nor should 
have known of their plans, the argument could be made that Israel could not be held re-
sponsible under article 29 for their actions. 
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Violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention carry specific 
sanctions. Under article 146, the country responsible must enact 
any legislation necessary to provide "effective penal sanctions" for 
persons committing "grave breaches" as defined in article 147 and 
must search for such violators and bring them before its courts. 
"Grave breaches" include "willful killing, torture or inhuman 
treatment."157 Under common article 1, it is the responsibility of 
the contracting parties, including the United States, to "undertake 
to respect and to ensure respect [for the Convention] in all circum-
stances." In a briefing memorandum on "United States Interna-
tional Commitments Concerning the Protection of Palestinians Re-
maining in the Beirut Area" drafted September 18, 1982, and 
recently declassified and released by the State Department in liti-
gation, the United States' obligation under article 1 is duly noted 
and the memorandum concludes that "to the extent that Israeli 
forces were in a position to control access to and security within 
the camps and failed to do so, Israel would be in breach of its obli-
gations under the Convention."158 A section addressed to the 
United States' responsibility for the Palestinians based on its guar-
antees of safety is deleted. 
B. The Responsibility of Individual Israeli Officials 
Thus far, this analysis has focused on Israel's responsibility as 
a state for the massacres. For the nine individuals sent notices of 
harm by the Commission-former Prime Minister Begin, Defense 
Minister Sharon, Foreign Minister Shamir, Chief of Staff Eitan, 
Director of Military Intelligence Saguy, Head of the Mossad Major 
General Drori, Brigadier General Y aron and Sharon's aide 
Duda-personalliability for the massacres under international law 
would be determined primarily by the Nuremberg Principles,159 af-
firmed by the United Nations General Assembly160 and acknowl-
edged as part of customary international law by the Supreme 
Court of Israel in the Eichmann case.161 The tragic irony of apply-
157. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, art. 147. 
158. FOIA DocuMENT, supra note 1, No. 148, attachment no. 25, p.3 (Sept. 18, 1982). 
159. London Agreement, Aug. 9, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 
[hereinafter cited as Nuremberg Principles]. 
160. G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at 188 (1946). 
161. Eichmann v. Attorney Gen., 36 I.L.R. 277, 296 (S. Ct. of Israel, sitting as a Ct. of 
Criminal Appeal, 1962) (the Nuremberg Principles have been part of the law of nations 
since "time inlmemorial"); see also F. BoYLE, supra note 133, at 15 (suggesting that the U.S. 
also may have violated the Nuremberg Principles by supplying amiS to Israel). 
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ing the Nuremberg Principles to the Israeli officials is that the 
Principles were originally formulated to punish the atrocities of 
the Nazi regime against the Jewish people.162 
Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Principles defines "crime 
against peace" to include "planning, preparation, initiation or wag-
ing of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the forego-
ing." Article 6(b) defines the term "war crime" to include "murder 
[and] ill treatment ... of a civilian population of or in occupied 
territory ... not justified by military necessity," and article 6(c) 
defines a "crime against humanity" to include "murder, extermina-
tion . . . and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population . . . . " The same article provides that "leaders, or-
ganizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formula-
tion or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of 
the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by per-
sons in execution of such plan." 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a violation of customary 
international law, the United Nations Charter and several resolu-
tions on aggression pursuant to the Charter.163 Specifically, Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon was a war of aggression, not self-defense as 
that concept has come to be defined under post-United Nations 
Charter international law. The United Nations Charter, binding on 
Israel as a member of the United Nations and binding as custom-
ary international law, requires members to settle international dis-
162. S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 32, 37. After World War II, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France wrote the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal that was subsequently applied in the trial of the German 
defendants at Nuremberg. It provided for individual criminal responsibility for crimes 
against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Charter. Id. 
163. See generally F. BoYLE, supra note 133, at 7-11 (concluding that Israel's invasion 
violated various international agreements); see also S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra 
note 39, at 13-29 (discussing Israel's contention that the invasion was justified as self-de-
fense). For a detailed and more favorable perspective on Israel's assertions of self-defense 
prior to the 1982 invasion, see Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: 
Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law, 21 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 
(1982). Even this article, however, is critical of the lack of proportionality in Israel's actions 
of purported self-defense. As the article went to press, Israel invaded Lebanon. Id. at 48 
n.158. 
The United Nations Security Council issued two resolutions, calling for a cease fire af-
ter the invasion and demanding that Israel withdraw all its forces unconditionally from Leb-
anon. S.C. Res. 508 & 509, (demanding that Israel withdraw and that a cease fire begin) 
(1982), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., September 1982, at 14. These resolutions are binding 
on all members of the United Nations under article 25 of the United Nations Charter. 
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putes by peaceful means.16' It also prohibits members from using 
force against the "territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state . . . . "166 There are only six instances in which the use of 
force is justified under the Charter, none of which is applicable to 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon.166 The right of self-defense under ar-
ticle 51 is the only instance in which an individual state without 
U.N. authorization may resort to force under the Charter. 
In the past, Israel has relied on the right of self-defense in the 
event of an "armed attack" under article 51 as justification for its 
actions in retaliation for a PLO attack anywhere in the world on 
any Jewish person.167 Article 51 preserves "the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security." By its terms, article 51 applies to an armed attack 
against a United Nations "Member," that is, the state itself. That 
language demonstrates an intent to confine the exercise of self-de-
fense to those actions necessary to protect the territorial integrity 
and security of the state-an interpretation reinforced by several 
related United Nations resolutions to be discussed. 
In a paper on the legal aspects of the invasion issued by the 
Information Division of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
164. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 11 3, art. 33. For a discussion of whether Israel satisfied this 
requirement before its resort to force, see S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 
21-22. 
165. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 11 4. 
166. These are the rights of individual and collective self-defense in the event of an 
"armed attack" as prescribed by article 51; chapter 7 "enforcement action" by the appropri-
ate regional organizations acting with the authorization of the Security Council as required 
by article 53; the peace-keeping operations under the jurisdiction of the Security Council 
pursuant to chapter 6 or under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly pursuant to the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/1775 (1950), or by a regional organization under the supervision of the Security Council 
pursuant to chapter 8 and articles 24 and 25. 
On May 17, 1983, the Lebanese and Israeli governments concluded an Agreement on 
Troop Withdrawal mediated by the United States. The text appears in N.Y. Times May 17, 
1983, at A4, cols. 1-6. The Agreement mandated an Israeli troop withdrawal after with-
drawal of Syrian and Palestinian troops from Lebanon. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, at 14, col. 
3. It has been argued that the agreement is void under article 51 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmd. 7964), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 698 (1969), which provides: 
Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force 
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force 
in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
167. S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 7-8. 
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government justified the invasion as follows: 
Israel was faced with a vast terrorist arsenal of thousands of tons of 
weapons, ammunition, missiles and heavy artillery equipment, all of 
which constituted a direct, immediate and actual threat to Israel's 
security. The magnitude and immediacy of the threat, and the ac-
tual use of the fire power against civilian objectives both within 
Israel and in southern Lebanon, as well as the murderous terror op-
erations against Jews and Israelis throughout the world, left no al-
ternative but to remove that threat and to neutralize the scope of 
operations, including the headquarters, stores and infrastructure, so 
far as to prevent its reappearance in the future.168 
These purported justifications do not meet the international 
legal standard of self-defense. They fail to demonstrate that 
Israel's action was in response to an "armed attack"; rather, they 
demonstrate only an unlawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense. 
Even assuming a proper invocation of the right to self-defense, 
Israel violated international law by responding. disproportionately 
to the threat to its state. 
The concept of an "armed attack" prerequisite to the exercise 
of self-defense is clarified by three United Nations General Assem-
bly resolutions: the Definition of Aggression, 169 the Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sover-
eignty, 170 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.171 The Defini-
tion of Aggression is a clarification of the United Nations Security 
Council's jurisdiction over "any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression."172 Article 1 defines aggression as "the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations 
••• 
11173 Article 2 provides that the first use of armed force by a 
168. FOIA DocUMENT, supra note 1, Briefing 342/18.7.82/3.10.108, at 2. 
169. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
170. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). 
171. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
172. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
173. (Emphasis added.) Proponents of a broader concept of self-defense often refer to 
the negotiating history of article 51 and the French text that uses the term "aggression 
armee." See, e.g., S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 13 (suggesting that the 
French text more accurately reflects the negotiation history). The negotiating history may 
be used to support almost any interpretation of article 51. Even assuming that the French 
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state in contravention of the United Nations Charter is prima facie 
evidence of an act of aggression, defined in article 3 to include the 
invasion by armed forces of another state. Article 3 also provides 
that the sending of armed bands to carry out acts of armed force 
against a state must be of sufficient gravity to be tantamount to an 
invasion or attack against the state itself. Finally, article 5 adopts 
the Nuremberg Principles, which make armed aggression a "crime 
against peace," and prohibit territorial acquisition by virtue of 
such aggression.174 
According to United Nations reports, the PLO did not launch 
any sort of "armed attack" against Israel but in fact was abiding 
by the terms of a cease fire negotiated in the summer of 1981 by 
President Reagan's special envoy, Phillip Habib.175 Begin himself 
admitted that the invasion of Lebanon was not an exercise of self-
defense necessary to preserve the state.176 The concept of an 
"armed attack" triggering self-defense must be narrowly circum-
scribed to prevent states from resorting to armed aggression in an-
ticipation of perceived "threats" to their welfare. As Israel's inva-
sion of Lebanon illustrates, without such limitation the self-
defense exception swallows the general rule that disputes be re-
solved by peaceful means. 
The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law prohibit armed in-
tervention against another state and reaffirm the United Nations 
text's use of "armed aggression" is broader than "armed attack," the argument remains that 
the United Nations definition of aggression refers to the use of force and that the examples 
of aggression given in article 3 of the definition all involve the actual use of force against 
another state. 
174. S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 15. United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 95(1) (1946) acknowledges as international law the Charter and Judg-
ment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. See infra notes 159-61 and ac-
companying text. 
175. F. BoYLE, supra note 133, at 8-9; S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 
10; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Leba-
non, U.N. Doc. S/15194/Add. 1 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 908 (1982) (reporting on 
events in Lebanon between Dec. 11, 1981, and June 3, 1982). A written version of this cease 
fire agreement between Israel and the PLO after Israel's 1981 aerial bombardment of Leba-
non has not been made public. S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 7. 
176. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1982, at A6, col. 6; F. BoYLE, supra note 133, at 9-10; M. 
JANSEN, supra note 16, at 123-25. In Begin's speech to the National Defense College re-
ported in the above New York Times article, he stated that the invasion of Lebanon, as well 
as the 1956 war and the 1967 war, were not necessary wars of self-defense. I d. at 139. When 
Eitan was asked in 1981 why he advocated an invasion of Lebanon, he answered: "What do 
you suppose I have built a large modern army for?" N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1982, at A21, col. 
2. 
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Charter's requirement that international disputes be resolved by 
peaceful means, the use of force being a last resort. In addition, the 
International Court of Justice held under post-Charter customary 
international law that Albania's violation of international law 
(knowingly allowing its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states, i.e., the laying of mines in the Straits of 
Corfu) could not excuse the United Kingdom's own violation by 
attempting to remove the mines.177 Thus one state's violation of 
international law does not ipso facto permit another state to re-
spond in violation of international law. In the instant case, Leba-
non had an obligation to assure that its territory was not being 
used by the PLO in violation of international law, but its failure to 
do so, either through unwillingness or inability, cannot justify 
Israel's armed intervention in Lebanon. 
The primary justification for Israel's invasion of Lebanon ap-
pears to be the existence of a "terrorist arsenal" that purportedly 
constituted "a direct, immediate and actual threat to Israel's se-
curity."178 Even assuming that such an arsenal existed, the viabil-
ity of this justification would depend initially on whether a right of 
anticipatory self-defense can be found either under article 51 or 
under post-Charter international law. As discussed above, the text 
of article 51, in conjunction with subsequent United Nations reso-
lutions and the paramount Charter requirement that international 
disputes be resolved by peaceful means, leads to the conclusion 
that there must be an actual armed attack to justify the lawful 
exercise of self-defense. Moreover, the Corfu Channel case repudi-
ated the concepts of intervention, protection and self-help in post-
Charter international law.179 Given the many varying interpreta-
tions of that decision, it is worthwhile to quote the court at length: 
The court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the 
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise 
to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the P.resent 
177. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36; see also F. BoYLE, supra note 
133, at 4. 
178. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
179. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35. This article does not address 
separately the issue of whether the invasion could be justified as a reprisal under interna-
tional law. Reprisals differ from self-defense primarily in intent in that they are punitive in 
nature and come after the harm has already been inflicted. Bowett, Reprisals Involving 
Recourse to Armed Force, 66 A.J.I.L. 1, 1-3, 10-11 (1972). The arguments made for a restric-
tive interpretation of the right of self-defense apply with equal force to the concept of repri-
sals. Also, as with the concept of anticipatory self-defense, the invasion as a reprisal would 
fail to meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality. 
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defects in international organization, find a place in international 
law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular 
form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be 
reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to per-
verting the administration of international justice itself. 
The United Kingdom agent, in his speech in reply, has further 
classified "Operation Retail" among methods of self-protection or 
self-help. The Court cannot accept this defence either. Between in-
dependent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential 
foundation of international relations. The Court recognizes that the 
Albanian Government's complete failure to carry out its duties after 
the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are 
extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom 
Government. But to ensure respect for international law, of which it 
is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British 
Navy constituted a violation of the Albanian sovereignty.180 
Nevertheless, the concept of anticipatory self-defense dies a 
hard death for reasons unrelated to international law.181 Govern-
ments are reluctant to stand idly by when confronted with what 
they perceive, rightly or wrongly, to be a threat to their nation, 
particularly when the United Nations Security Council appears un-
willing or unable to act. 
Accepting, arguendo, the concept of anticipatory self-defense, 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon must be deemed unlawful for failing 
to meet the accepted requisites for lawful self-defense. The classic 
formulation of the customary right of self-defense was stated by 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster referring to the destruction of 
the steamship Caroline by the British forces at Niagara Falls: self-
defense is confined to cases in which the "necessity of that self-
defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation."~82 Moreover, the response must 
be strictly limited to the object of stopping or preventing the dan-
ger and .must be reasonably proportionate to what is required for 
achieving this object.183 These requirements of necessity and pro-
portionality are interrelated in the context of the Israeli invasion 
in that they are both determined by the seriousness of the threat 
180. 1949 I.C.J. at 35. In light of the Court's language, it is difficult to explain one 
commentator's conclusion that "[t]he Corfu Channel court permitted the use of force in the 
face of a strong probability of armed attack." Levenfeld, supra note 163, at 27. 
181. See, e.g., Levenfeld, supra note 163, at 20-21. 
182. 2 J. MooRE, A DIGEST oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 412-14 (1906). 
183. Wadlock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Interna-
tional Law, 81 AcAD. DE DROIT INT'L RECUEIL DES CoURS 455, 463-64 (1952). 
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posed by the PLO to Israel before the invasion. The purportedly 
vast terrorist arsenals in Lebanon did not materialize, at least in 
relation to West Beirut.184 As noted earlier, Begin acknowledged 
that the long planned invasion was not necessary to the state of 
Israel, 1811 nor was it proportional to the triggering aggression.186 An 
Israeli official announced that Israeli attacks in Lebanon would not 
be proportionate/57 and indeed they were not. From the cease fire 
on July 24, 1981, until the invasion, Israel claimed before theSe-
curity Council that the PLO had claimed seventeen victims.188 One 
authority estimated that as many as twelve to fifteen thousand ci-
vilians died in Lebanon/89 but by any count the casualties in Leba-
non far exceeded the casualties inflicted by PLO attacks. 
Turning, then, to the issue of individual responsibility for 
these violations of international law, under article 6 of the Nurem-
berg Principles, the leaders, organizers and other Israel officials 
who acted to formulate and execute the invasion are responsible 
for crimes against peace and for all acts performed by any persons 
in execution of the invasion. Israeli officials who planned the inva-
sion viewed the Phalangists' entry into the camps and their "mop-
ping up" of the camps as an integral and necessary part of the 
invasion of Lebanon.19° For example, Sharon insisted that entry 
into the camps was necessary to rid them of two thousand ter-
rorists, 191 but such a vast terrorist presence was never proved.192 
Aside from their responsibility for the massacres predicated on 
the illegal invasion, the individuals that received notices of harm 
from the Commission (with only the possible exceptions of the 
184. See M. JANSEN, supra note 16, at 4-6; see also REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION TO ENQUIRE INTO REPORTED VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY ISRAEL DUR-
ING ITS INVASION OF LEBANON: ISRAEL IN LEBANON 14-23 (1983) (hereinafter cited as ISRAEL lN 
LEBANON). 
185. See supra note 176; see also IsRAEL IN LEBANON, supra note 184, at 14-23. 
186. F. BoYLE, supra note 133, at 11; S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 
27-29. 
187. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1982, at A3, col. 5. 
188. S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 23. 
189. M JANSEN, supra note 16, at 25. 
190. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 12; N.Y. Tinles, Sept. 26, 1982, at A6, col. 5; N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at 6, cols. 4-5. The New York Times reported that during the second 
week of the war Sharon was considering sending the Phalangists into Shatilla, Sabra and 
Fakhani in West Beirut. N.Y. Tinles, Oct. 20, 1982, at A6, col. 5. Sharon testified before the 
Commission that "there had been a long-standing Cabinet decision, taken early in the war, 
to involve the Phalange forces in the fighting to help prevent I.D.F. casualties." FOIA Docu-
MENT, supra note 1, No. 326, Dep't of State Incoming Telegram. 
191. The Times (London), Sept. 29, 1982, at 8, cols. 2-5. 
192. See KAHAN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
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head of Mossad and Duda'i, whom the Commission absol~ed) 
could be responsible for war crimes or conceivably crimes against 
humanity given the findings of the Report. In Application of 
Yamashita, General Yamashita of Japan was tried by a special 
United States military commission applying the international laws 
of war as incorporated into United States domestic law.193 
Yamashita was charged with war crimes, including the massacre of 
civilian populations in the Phillipines, which also is a crime against 
humanity under the Nuremberg Principles. The gist of the charge 
was that Yamashita failed as commander to control the troops in 
· his command and thereby prevent the alleged atrocities. In holding 
Yamashita responsible for the alleged war crimes, the Court estab-
lished that an official or commander who has actual knowledge, or 
should have knowledge, through reports received by him or 
through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his 
control are about to commit or have committed war crimes, and 
fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to ensure compli-
ance with the law of war, is responsible for such crimes.19' 
The Kahan Report concluded that Begin, Sharon, Shamir, 
Eitan, Saguy, Drori, Yaron, and to a lesser extent the head of the 
Mossad, should have known of the likelihood of a massacre and 
either failed to prevent the entry of the Phalangists into the camps 
and/ or failed to take steps to restrain the Phalangists once the 
massacres had begun and information to that effect was re-
ceived.195 The Commission did not fault Begin for not inquiring 
193. 327 u.s. 1 (1946). 
194. Id. at 14-16; U.S. ARMY FIELD MANuAL 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 11 501, at 
178-79 (1956). 
195. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-20. At the conclusion of its determination, the 
Report made only recommendations and remarks concerning the eight faulted individuals. 
For Begin, Shamir and the head of Mossad, however, no recommendations were made, the 
Report concluding that it was "sufficient to determine responsibility." I d. at 22. For Major 
General Drori as well, no recommendation was made given the difficulty of his tasks during 
that week in the eyes of the Commission and given that his guilt was predicated on his 
failure to continue the measures he did take for terminating the Phalangists' actions. I d. For 
Defense Minister Sharon, in contrast, the Commission suggested that the Defense Minister 
"draw the appropriate personal conclusions ..• and if necessary, that the Prime Minister 
consider whether he should exercise his authority under section 21-A(a) of the Basic Law: 
the Government, according to which the Prime Minister may, after informing the Cabinet of 
his intention to do so, remove a minister from office." The Commission made no recommen-
dations as to Chief of Staff Eitan despite its "grave conclusions" regarding his responsibil-
ity, because his term of service was to end in April of 1983. Id. at 22. The Commission 
recommended that Director of Military Intelligence Saguy not continue as director. I d. Brig-
adier General Y aron, it was suggested, was not to serve in the capacity of a field commander 
in the IDF, with the recommendation that he not be reconsidered before three years had 
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into the details of the entry into West Beirut, but did find that he 
bore "a certain degree of responsibility" for failing to show any 
interest at any time in the Phalangists' entry into the camps after 
he learned of it in Thursday's Cabinet session, despite his aware-
ness of the likelihood of a massacre.196 Shamir was blamed for hav-
ing failed to take appropriate steps when told of the "slaughter" by 
Minister Zipori on Friday.197 Chief of Staff Eitan was reprimanded, 
as was Sharon, for the decision to have the Phalangists enter the 
camps, again with the suggestion that a massacre was anticipated: 
[I]t is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Chief of Staff ignored 
this danger [to the civilian population] out of an awareness that 
there were great advantages to sending the Phalangists into the 
camps, and perhaps also out of a hope that in the final analysis, 
the Phalangist excesses would not be on a large scale.198 
Eitan also was blamed for: (1) not imposing checks on the 
Phalangists; (2) failing to check reports of killings; and (3) failing 
to stop the Phalangists' operations on Friday, particularly during 
his meeting with the Phalangist commanders.199 Director of Mili-
tary Intelligence Saguy was held responsible for: (1) having failed 
to pay sufficient attention to the decision to send in the 
Phalangists; (2) having failed to warn the bureaucracy of the likeli-
hood of bloodshed; and (3) having failed to attempt to stop the 
operation, the Commission stating it "could not believe" that he 
was not aware of the decision to send in the Phalangists until Fri-
day morning. 200 Drori was commended for having ordered a halt to 
the Phalangists on Friday morning, but faulted for failing to ap-
prise Eitan on Friday of the danger to the civilians and failing to 
curtail continuation of the killings in his meeting with the 
Phalangists and thereafter.201 Brigadier General Yaron, according 
to the Report, received reports of the killings of women and chil-
dren on Thursday evening, yet (1) did not check the report, (2) did 
not pass on the reports to the G.O.C. and Chief of Staff, and (3) 
passed. I d. The Commission also recommended that an investigation be made into the func-
tioning of the political organs and military branches to promote better communications, and 
possibly to determine any individuals responsible for its shortcoming in communication. I d. 
at 21-22. 
196. Id. at 14. 
197. Id. at 16. 
198. Id. (emphasis added). 
199. Id. at 16-17. 
200. Id. at 17-18. 
201. Id. at 18-19. 
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did not take appropriate steps to stop the Phalangists and protect 
the civilians. 202 A vi Duda'i was not faulted for failing to pass on to 
the Minister of Defense the report of the massacres he purportedly 
received on Friday morning because the Commission was unable to 
determine if he had in fact received such a report.203 The head of 
the Mossad was absolved of any "serious" responsibility because 
he had not heard of the decision to send in the Phalangists until 
the Thursday Cabinet meeting and he had assumed his position 
only two days before Bashir Jemayel's assassination. Nevertheless, 
the Commission said that at least he should have addressed the 
dangers of the Phalangists' entry in the camps.204 
. As to Sharon, the Commission came very close to suggesting 
that Sharon sent in the Phalangists anticipating a massacre: 
If in fact the Defense Minister, when he decided that the 
Phalangists would enter the camps without the I.D.F. taking part in 
the operation, did not think that that decision could bring about the 
very disaster that in fact occurred, the only possible explanation for 
this is that he disregarded any apprehensions about what was to be 
expected because the advantages [to reduce the I.D.F. casualties, to 
involve the Phalangists in the fighting, and to discover terrorists] to 
be gained from the Phalangists' entry into the camps distracted him 
from th~ proper consideration in this instance. 205 
Having decided to send in the Phalangists, Sharon was also cen-
sured for failing to impose any checks on the Phalangists, but not 
for his failure to halt their operations-because the Commission 
found that Sharon learned of the killings Friday evening and was 
told that the Phalangists would be out by the next morning.206 
By the time of the jury decision in Sharon v. Time, Inc.,207 
Sharon had already risen from the ashes of the Kahan Report to 
the influential position of Minister of Commerce and Industry. 
The central issue in the libel suit, however, was not Sharon's re-
sponsibility for the massacres. The determinative issue from a libel 
perspective was whether Time could muster enough admissible evi-
dence from the sources on which it had relied to demonstrate that 
its story was true, or alternatively, that it had not acted with 
202. Id. at 19. 
203. Id. at 19-20. 
204. Id. at 18. 
205. Id. at 15. 
206. Id. 
207. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (opinion denying sum-
mary judgment). 
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knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity of its story.208 On two 
issues preliminary to the final verdict, the jury had reached find-
ings in favor of Sharon. First, the jury found that the implication 
of Time's story was that Sharon had intended a massacre to take 
place, an implication that went beyond the Report's lesser finding 
that Sharon should have foreseen that a massacre would take 
place. Second, the jury had to determine the truth or falsity of the 
paragraph claiming there was information in Appendix B that 
Sharon had discussed revenge with the Jemayels. Sharon simply 
testified that no such discussion had taken place. That testimony 
left Time with the unenviable task of demonstrating the actual 
truth of the statement without the benefit of any of the reporter's 
confidential sources, whose testimony had been excluded as hear-
say. In addition, the Israeli government had initially refused to re-
lease the contents of Appendix B. Eventually both sides were per-
mitted to read Appendix B, but Israel refused to permit Time to 
examine other secret documents that Time claimed would support 
its story. When Time was forced to concede that Appendix B did 
not contain information concerning the alleged discussion, the lack 
of evidence in Time's favor left the jury with little alternative but 
to find that the story was false given Sharon's testimony. On the 
ultimate issue of Time's intent in publishing the story, the jury 
refused to find Time had published the false paragraph with 
knowledge or a reckless disregard of its falsity, but in an unusual 
closing statement berated Time for its "negligence" in failing to 
verify its story adequately.209 The only fact relevant to Sharon's 
responsibility for the massacres that was conclusively determined 
in the Time case is that Appendix B does not state that Sharon 
discussed revenge with the Jemayels. Although the jury did find 
that the paragraph on Sharon's alleged discussion was false, Time 
has maintained such a discussion did take place but that it was 
208. The disputed paragraph in its entirety reads as follows: 
One section of the report, known as Appendix B, was not published at all, mainly for 
security reasons. That section contains the names of several intelligence agents re-
ferred to elsewhere in the report. Time has learned that it also contains further de-
tails about Sharon's visit to the Gemayel family on the day after Bashir Gemayel's 
assassination. Sharon reportedly told the Gemayels that the Israeli army would be 
moving into West Beirut and that he expected the Christian forces to go into the 
Palestinian refugee camps. Sharon also reportedly discussed with the Gemayels the 
need for the Phalangists to take revenge for the assassination of Bashir, but the de-
tails of the conversation are not known. 
Doerner, Man With a Mission, TIME, Feb. 11, 1985, at 29. 
209. McGrath & Stadtman, Absence of Malice, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 52, col. 1. 
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unable to introduce the evidence necessary to support the truth of 
the statement. In any event, there is already speculation that 
Sharon's "moral victory" in the case will enhance his political 
future.210 
Given these findings, the conclusion is inescapable that at 
least seven of the nine individuals named should have known of 
the likelihood of a massacre before the Phalangists' entry, knew a 
massacre was going on after their entry, or should have known that 
a massacre was going on, yet failed to take appropriate steps to 
protect the civilian population. Under customary international law, 
and specifically the Nuremberg Principles, they could therefore be 
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
C. The Responsibility of Parties Not Addressed in the Kahan 
Report 
The Kahan Report did not address the responsibility of par-
ties outside of Israel but did touch briefly on the potential respon-
sibility of the United States and Lebanon. A similarly brief analy-
sis of such responsibility is appropriate here. Under the Geneva 
Conventions the United States had a responsibility to ensure com-
pliance with the conventions by contracting parties such as 
IsraeJ.211 Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also obli-
gates the United States to bring before an American court for 
prosecution any party alleged to have committed a grave breach of 
the Convention if the party should enter the United States' terri-
tory. Israel, therefore, is not alone in failing to impose the sanc-
tions provided under international law for the massacres. 
The extent of the United States' responsibility may not be 
limited to its failure to bring others to justice, however. As the Re-
port stated, "[o]ne might also make charges concerning the hasty 
evacuation of the multinational force by the countries whose 
troops were in place until after the evacuation of the terrorists."212 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon began on June 6, 1982.213 On Au-
210. Id. at 57. 
211. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, art. 1. The United States bears a 
special responsibility for the actions of Israel by virtue of its extensive aid to Israel. One 
source estimates that United States aid to Israel from 1974 has equalled $25.3 billion or $7 
million each day for the last ten years. THE BITrER YEAR, supra note 89, at 4. According to 
the same source, less than twenty-four hours after the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla, a 
congressional committee voted to increase United States aid to Israel by $335 million. Id. 
212. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
213. I d. at 4. The Commission briefly addressed in the Report whether the mere inclu-
sion of the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut could be the basis for indirect Israeli 
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gust 19, Lebanon, the United States, France, Italy, Israel and the 
PLO reached an agreement for the evacuation of PLO and Syrian 
forces from West Beirut.214 From August 21 to 26, the multina-
tional American, French and Italian force arrived in Beirut, where 
they oversaw the evacuation of PLO and Syrian forces until com-
pleted on September 1. The Report then noted that: 
[A]ccording to information from various sources, the terrorists did 
not fulfill their obligation to evacuate all their forces from West Bei-
rut and hand their weapons over to the Lebanese army but left in 
West Beirut, according to various estimates, approximately 2000 
fighters, as well as many arms caches, some of which were handed 
over by the terrorists to the Lebanese leftist militia 
''Mourabitoun."215 
The multinational force left Lebanon after the completion of the 
evacuation-less than one week before the massacres. The United 
States Marine contingent of the multinational force withdrew from 
Beirut at 2:00 A.M. on September 10, 1982, before the end of the 
thirty-day period originally specified by the President.216 The 
United States had a special responsibility for the Palestinians in 
that the PLO withdrawal from Beirut was in return for the United 
States' and Israel's guarantees of safety for the Palestinian civil-
ians remaining in Lebanon.217 According to information issued by 
the Department of State: 
On August 20, 1982, the United States announced that agreement 
had been reached by the governments of-Lebanon, Israel, France, 
Italy and the United States and by the Palestine Liberation Organi-
responsibility for the massacres. First, the Commission concluded that the June 15 resolu-
tion could not be utilized as the basis for the Phalangists' later involvement in the entry 
into West Beirut, as urged by Begin and Sharon. It found that the circumstances in June 
had changed entirely by September after the evacuation of Syrian and PLO forces and after 
Bashir Jemayel's assassination. Nevertheless, despite the lack of a formal Cabinet resolu-
tion, the Commission concluded that no responsibility for the massacres could be predicated 
on the involvement of the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut. The political and mili-
tary reasons for including the Phalangists justified their involvement in West Beirut accord-
ing to the Report, negating any potential responsibility on that basis alone. Id. at 13. 
214. I d. See also BUREAu OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 
415, LEBANON: PLAN FOR THE PLQ EvACUATION FROM WEST BEIRUT (Aug. 1982) (this agree-
ment was reached with the negotiating assistance of Special United States Ambassador 
Philip C. Habib) [hereinafter cited as CURRENT PoLICY No. 415). 
215. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. 
216. BUREAU oF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT PoLicY No. 418, PREsi-
DENT REAGAN'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE lNITIATIVE 1 (Sept. 10, 1982). 
217. There were duly signed assurances from American envoy Philip Habib, guaran-
teeing the safety of the families of the leaders after their departure from Beirut. 
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zation (PLO) on a plan for the departure from Lebanon of PLO 
leaders, officers, and combatants in Beirut. In the context of provid-
ing safeguards for the implementation of the plan, the United States 
conveyed to the Government of Lebanon the assurances received 
from the Government of Israel "that it would not interfere with im-
plementation of any part of the plan, including its provisions with 
respect to persons left behind in Beirut" and "that it would do the 
utmost to ensure that those assurances would be scrupulously ob-
served. The U.S. also conveyed to the Government of Lebanon as-
surances regarding the safety of Palestinians and other inhabitants 
of West Beirut received from the leadership of certain Lebanese 
groups with which the U.S. had been in touch."218 
One might question whether withdrawal of the United States' 
forces before the expiration of their original mandate was taken 
with due regard for the safety of'the remaining Palestinian popula-
tion in West Beirut. In a recent article that examines the United 
States' legal responsibility for the massacres, the author concludes, 
in part based on the findings of the Kahan Report, that: (1) the 
United States did expressly give a guarantee of safety for the re-
maining Palestinians in Beirut based on the assurances the United 
States obtained from Israel and the Phalangists; (2) the guarantee 
was to extend beyond the departure of the multinational force; (3) 
the communication of this guarantee could have been either oral or 
written; (4) the United States was unable to fulfill its assurances to 
the PLO following the takeover of West Beirut by the IDF; and (5) 
both Israel and the Phalangists, who apparently had given assur-
ances to the United States, violated their commitments.219 How-
ever, as the author notes, the result is merely that the United 
States violated its legal obligations under the August 20, 1982, de-
parture plan for the PL0,220 with substantive responsibility for the 
massacres to be determined by other rules of international law 
such as the Nuremberg Principles and the Geneva Conventions. 
Could the United States be directly responsible under interna-
tional law for the massacres? Such responsibility would depend 
218. FOIA DoCUMENT, supra note 1, Exhibit E, Jabara v. Schultz. This statement was 
a response from the Department of State to one of a series of questions relating to the 
massacre submitted to the Department by Congressmen George Crockett and Clement 
Zablocki on February 4, 1983. 
219. Hassan, The Legal Implications for the United States in the PLO Evacuation 
from Beirut, 18 TExAs INT'L L.J. 509, 539 (1983). It might be noted that the political unpop-
ularity of sending the Marines to Beirut as part of the multinational force undoubtedly 
contributed to their being withdrawn at the earliest possible moment. 
220. Id. 
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largely on when the United States first learned of the massacres 
and what action it took and could have taken to stop them. The 
Report refused to discuss the question of when non-Israeli individ-
uals first learned of the massacres and whether they did what they 
could to end them. 221 Whatever information the Commission might 
have had about such responsibility on the part of the United 
States, it was not revealed. But suggestions as to United States' 
knowledge of the ongoing massacres did appear in the Report. At 
the meeting between Eitan, Drori, Y aron and the Phalangists on 
Friday the seventeenth at 4:00 P.M., the Phalangists told Eitan 
that the Americans were "pressuring them to leave."222 From 6:00 
P.M. to 8:00 P.M. on Friday, September 17, unidentified Foreign 
Ministry personnel began receiving reports from unidentified 
United States representatives that "the Phalangists had been seen 
in the camps and that their presence was liable to lead to undesir-
able results-as well as complaints about actions by I.D.F. soldiers 
in the hospital building in Beirut. "223 The Report said the Ministry 
investigated the complaints and resolved that they were 
"unfounded."224 
221. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
222. !d. at 9. See infra note 234 and accompanying text for the possible source of this 
American pressure. 
223. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Hanon Baro-On, Assistant Director-General of 
the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, testified that at about 6:30P.M. that Friday he received 
such a call from an American official and transmitted the information about the irregulari-
ties to Begin's military secretary that evening. He personally spoke to the Prime Minister's 
military aide, Lieutenant Colonel A2riel Nevo, and it was his understanding of the military 
aide's job that the information would be given to Begin. Baro-On did not know whether the 
aide had in fact transmitted the information to Begin. FOIA DocuMENT, supra note 1, No. 
346, Dep't of State Incoming Telegram. In Nevo's testimony, he denied having received any 
call from Baro-On. The Times (London), Nov. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 4. Bruce Kashdan, an 
Israeli Foreign Ministry representative in Beirut, also testified that Morris Draper called 
him on Friday between 7:00 and 8:30P.M. and informed him that: 
Lebanese Prime Minister Wa2zan had told him that soldiers had entered one of the 
hospitals in the camps and had started killing there. Draper also related that Wazzan 
had told him these were Phalangists in the Shatilla camp. Draper reportedly contin-
ued that his "own officers (not further identified) had seen about two hundred Phal-
ange soldiers and ten trucks at Beirut airport. Draper then is said to have remarked 
to Kashdan that "using Phalangists in West Beirut could have horrible results." 
Kashdan said he immediately passed Draper's report to the I.D.F. in Beirut and 
to Ariel Kenet, the Foreign Ministry Duty Officer, and Foreign Ministry Director 
General David Kimche. Kenet, in previous public testimony on November 14, upheld 
Kashdan's claim, noting that he also passed on Kashdan's report to Kimche and, at 
Kimche's request, to the duty officer at the Defense Ministry situation room in Tel 
Aviv. [Kimche testified only in camera, on November 7.] 
FOIA DocUMENT, supra note 1, No. 346, Dep't of State Incoming Telegram. 
224. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 
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An article in the Israeli paper Ma'ariv cited "Israeli elements" 
as stating that the United States "knew by noon on Friday, and 
perhaps even earlier, that civilians were being killed" in Shatilla, 
but perhaps did not know of the "scope of the killing" and did not 
transmit the information to any Israeli officials. 225 The same article 
stated that "U.S. diplomats in Beirut . . . influenced Lebanese 
Prime Minister Shafiq Al-Qazzan into refraining from sending 
Lebanese army units into the refugee camps," concluding "the 
United States involvement with everything regarding the refugee 
camps in Beirut proves that these elements had a degree of respon-
sibility for everything that took place in Shatilla, at least as much 
responsibility as Israel had. "226 American Embassy spokesmen, in 
response to inquiries from the Israeli newspapers Ha'aretz and 
Davar, stated that Draper had in fact encouraged direct contact 
between the IDF and the Lebanese army.227 Indeed, in President 
Reagan's speech following the massacres he stated: 
During the negotiations leading to the PLO withdrawal from Beirut, 
we were assured that Israeli forces would not enter West Beirut. We 
also understood that following withdrawal, Lebanese army units 
would establish control over the city. They were thwarted in this 
effort by the Israeli occupation that took place beginning on 
Wednesday. We strongly opposed Israel's move into West Beirut fol-
lowing the assassination of President-Elect Gemayal both because 
we believed it wrong in principle and for fear that it would provoke 
further fighting. Israel, by yesterday in military control of Beirut, 
claimed that its moves would prevent the kind of tragedy which has 
now occurred. 228 
According to a report in the London Times, United States intelli-
gence officials learned of the killings even earlier, on Thursday eve-
ning-only a few hours after the Phalangists entered the camps.229 
According to this same article, reports of "killings and beatings" 
reached the United States Foreign Relations Committee in Wash-
ington at 9:30 A.M. on Friday, the seventeenth. One explanation 
posited for the lack of any action based on this knowledge is that 
the United States' intelligence sources were so sensitive that they 
225. FOIA DocUMENT, supra note 1, No. 294, Ma'ariv report by military correspon-
dents Ya'aqov Erez and Yosef Wachsman (Sept. 30, 1982). 
226. Id. 
227. FOIA DocUMENT, supra note 1, No. 181, Dep't of State Incoming Telegram. 
228. FOIA DocUMENT, supra note I, No. 147, Dep't of State Incoming Telegram. 
229. Sunday Times (London), Jan. 30, 1983, at 1, col. 8. 
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could not be revealed. 230 
The first United States contact made with Israel appears to be 
that mentioned in the Report of a complaint from unidentified 
United States personnel to the Foreign Ministry between 6:00 and 
8:00 P.M. on Friday, the seventeenth, that the Phalangists had 
been seen in the camps (and their presence would lead to undesir-
able results) and that IDF soldiers were in a Beirut hospital.231 Ac-
cording to the Times, the· call was made by the United States 
charged' a:ffaires in Tel Aviv to Hanan Baro-on, assistant director 
of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem.232 In an earlier article, 
the Times also reported testimony before the Commission that be-
tween 7:00 and 8:30P.M. on Friday evening Bruce Kashdan, the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry representative in Beirut, received a call 
from Morris Draper who warned: "Using Phalangists in West Bei-
rut could have horrible results. "233 
Other suggestions of United States knowledge of the massa-
cre-and warnings even before the massacres-deserve mention. 
The director of the Palestine information office in Washington said 
he had contacted the Egyptian, Tunisian and Saudi Arabian offices 
in Washington and asked that a warning that the Lebanese militia 
forces with the support of the Israeli army were preparing to "de-
populate" refugee areas of Lebanon be passed on to the State De-
partment. He was told, although the articles does not say by 
whom, that the information had been checked "by United States 
authorities" and had been found to be "incorrect."234 A Tel Aviv 
paper, Ma'ariv, quoting unidentified "Israeli sources," also re-
ported that unnamed United States officials appealed to a Phal-
ange officer, Fadi Faram, the morning of Friday, September 17, 
and demanded withdrawal of his troops. 2315 In response, Reagan ad-
ministration spokesman Larry Speakes said "fragmentary" reports 
were received Friday night that "something was going on," but he 
insisted the United States was "not aware" of a massacre until 
Saturday, September 18.236 In NEA Press Guidance documents 
dated September 22, 1982, the suggested reply to questions of 
United States knowledge of the situation in the camps is that on 
230. I d. at 2, col. 6. 
231. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 
232. Sunday Times (London), Jan. 30, 1983, at 2, col. 6; see also supra note 220. 
233. The Times (London), Nov. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 4; see also supra note 219. 
234. L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1982, at $12, col. 1. 
235. Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1982, at A22, col. 4. 
236. Id. 
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Friday, September 17, "fragmentary and conflicting indications 
that something was amiss" were received, which were followed by 
expressions of concern to the Israeli liaison office near Beirut and 
to "the senior leadership of the Lebanese Forces/Phalange militia 
. . . . " The response further states that an embassy official entered 
Shatilla on Saturday morning (apparently the official referred to in 
Draper's outraged telephone call on Saturday).237 In response to 
the question: "What do you have on a report that the Tunisian 
Ambassador warned the United States on Wednesday of last week 
about movement by Phalangists into Palestinian refugee camps in 
Beirut?," it was suggested that "[t]he first indication we received 
that something was wrong in the camps came on Friday, Septem-
ber 17, and we began inquiries immediately."238 
The next complaint from United States personnel to Israeli 
personnel mentioned in the Report occurred on Saturday morning. 
The Chief of Staff and Sharon testified to the effect that Begin 
had spoken to Eitan on Saturday morning about American com-
plaints that the Phalangists had entered Gaza Hospital and had 
killed patients. 239 That same morning the Director General of the 
Foreign Ministry told Sharon that United States Ambassador Mor-
ris Draper had told him that Palestinians had been massacred.240 
Testimony before the Commission revealed that at 10:00 A.M. that 
Saturday Draper called Bruce Kashdan, the Israeli Foreign Minis-
try representative in Beirut and said he had a message for Sharon: 
"You must stop the massacres. They are obscene. I have an officer 
in the camp counting bodies. You ought to be ashamed. The situa-
tion is rotten and terrible. They are killing children. You are in 
absolute control of the area, and therefore responsible for that 
area."241 Kashdan transmitted this message to the Director Gen-
eral of the Foreign Ministry and it is apparently, at least in part, 
the message the Director General received from Draper and con-
. veyed to Sharon as noted in the Report. 242 
Recently the United States Department of State released gov-
ernment documents pursuant to litigation under the Freedom of 
237. FOIA DocuMENT, supra note 1, No. 226, NEA Press Guidance, Lebanon: U.S. 
Knowledge About Massacre (Sept. 22, 1982); see infra note 241 and accompanying text. 
238. FOIA DocuMENT, supra note 1, No. 227, NEA Press Guidance, Lebanon: Report 
Tunisian Warned of Movement Into Camps (Sept. 22, 1982). 
239. KAHAN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 10. 
240. !d. 
241. The Times (London), Nov. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 3. 
242. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
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Information Act that previously had been classified, excised or de-
nied, and that relate to the question of when the United States 
learned of the massacres. According to these documents, an Ameri-
can journalist informed the United States embassy on Friday, Sep-
tember 17, in Beirut, that around noon that day Shatilla was sur-
rounded by Israeli soldiers and tanks, and that approximately one 
hundred Phalangists were rounding up young men inside the 
camp. An hour later the embassy contacted a source whose name is 
deleted and was told "orders were being given" to have the 
Phalangists withdraw immediately. At 5:30P.M. that same day a 
Beirut embassy officer went to Shatilla and observed twenty to 
thirty Phalangists at the entrance to the camps who refused to al-
low him to enter. He reported no unusual activity specifically 
around the Akka and Gaza hospitals but a source (whose name is 
deleted) reported at 4:45P.M. that patients had been killed by the 
IDF. After deletions relating to September 17, a chronology of the 
United States' knowledge notes reports of killings the morning of 
September 18 that led to an embassy officer at Shatilla conveying 
the "first confirmed United States eyewitness information on [the] 
massacre between 10:30 and 11:00 P.M." All following entries are 
deleted. 243 
Given all of this conflicting background there may be some 
predicate for United States' responsibility for the massacres under 
the Nuremberg Principles and customary international law. As 
noted earlier, under the Yamashita case, an official or commander 
who knew or should have known that troops or other persons sub-
ject to his control have committed a war crime and fails to take 
any steps to assure compliance with international law is responsi-
ble for those crimes committed.244 To the extent that Israeli offi-
cials or the Phalangists could be viewed as subject to United 
States' control, and the United States officials failed to take mea-
sures protective of the camps' population once they knew or should 
have known of the massacres, they may be held responsible for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Obviously, the question of ef-
fective control by the United States would be far from clear. The 
Yamashita case involved a chain of military command and a com-
manding officer's failure to control his troops. Where a government 
official has the authority to oversee and effectively control the con-
243. FOIA DocuMENT, supra note 1, Attachments Nos. 15-17, Dep't of State Incoming 
Telegram. 
244. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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duct of the chain of command, there would appear to be no reason 
to distinguish between the responsibility of the government official 
and that of a military commander in controlling that government's 
troops. Responsibility becomes more attenuated when the question 
of control focuses on the extent of effective supervision one state's 
government officials can exercise over another state's military deci-
sions or the actions of a militia such as the Phalangists. The ques-
tion of responsibility in such circumstances would be dependent on 
factual issues of control difficult to prove without encountering the 
often insurmountable barrier of confidential government informa-
tion. However, one element of United States' control that should 
be pointed out in this context is control over the use of arms pur-
chased from the United States. As discussed earlier,245 our bilateral 
arms agreements and the Arms Export Control Act with Israel 
limit the use of arms to internal security, self-defense, and collec-
tive defense measures authorized by the United Nations. 
Turning to an alternate theory of potential liability, some evi-
dence has been advanced of United States knowledge and encour-
agement of Israel in the invasion of Lebanon. 246 Former President 
Carter stated to the press that he believed Washington had given 
Israel approval for the invasion.247 In that sense, as participants in 
the formulation and execution of a common plan to invade Leba-
non (a crime against peace), high ranking United States officials 
could be responsible for all acts performed by any person in execu-
tion of the plan under article 6. The deeper the extent of the 
United States' acquiescence in the invasion and in Israel's unlawful 
use of American weaponry in that invasion, the greater the poten-
tial individual responsibility of United States officials for complic-
ity in crimes against peace or humanity and war crimes committed 
or permitted by Israel or its agents. 
The responsibility of Lebanon is somewhat more complex. The 
. Kahan Commission merely suggested a degree of responsibility 
should be imposed on the Lebanese government and army for their 
failure to enter the camps in place of the Phalangists when re-
245. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
246. M. JANSEN, supra note 16, at 73-87; CURRENT PoLICY No. 415, supra note 214, at 
4; F. BoYLE, supra note 133, at 5-7; see also J. RANDAL, supra note 35, at 247-51 (addressing 
the issue of Secretary of State Alexander Haig's possible advance approval of the invasion). 
247. CURRENT PoLICY No. 415, supra note 214, at 4. It is also worth noting that section 
500 of the U.S. Army Field Manual on the law of land warfare provides individual criminal 
responsibility for "[c]onspiracy, direct incitement, and attempts to commit, as well as com-
plicity in the commission of, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes." U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 194, 'il 500, at 178. 
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quested to do so. 248 Certainly the Lebanese government and army 
were aware of the blood feud between the Palestinians and the 
Phalangists and the likely result of a confrontation between the 
two. The Hague Convention and Fourth Geneva Convention gov-
ern the conduct of Israel, Lebanon and Syria in their conflicts with 
each other. Much less clear is the extent to which either Conven-
tion could be said to govern the responsibility of the Lebanese gov-
ernment toward those who were residing in the refugee camps 
within its territory. In any event, at a minimum the Lebanese gov-
ernment is subject to the Geneva Conventions, which require every 
party to an armed conflict not of an international character to re-
frain from violence to life and person and to seek to ensure hu-
mane treatment of civilians.2" 9 Moreover, Lebanon is a party to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,2 G0 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,2G1 and the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination,2 G2 obligating it to accord the 
designated rights to all those within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction. Among other provisions, article 6 of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights guarantees every human being the right 
to life with the additional proviso in article 6(3) that when depri-
vation of life constitutes genocide, the Covenant does not derogate 
in any way from any obligations under the Genocide Convention. 
Individual responsibility would be premised again on the Nurem-
berg Principles and customary international law. If individuals in 
the Lebanese government or army knew or should have known 
that persons subject to their control were about to commit or were 
committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, they would 
themselves be responsible.2 G3 
The Phalangists also would be subject at a minimum to the 
248. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. Moreov_er, in Thomas Friedman's influential 
article after the massacre, he reported that "well-placed Israeli officials" said the military 
operation of the Phalangists was planned by Bashir Jemayel before his assassination and 
that the Israeli army assumed the entry was part of the overall plan laid out by Jemayel 
that he intended to carry out after he took office. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A6, cols. 4-
5; see also SABRA AND SHATILLA, supra note 22, at 85 and supra notes 90, 223 (citing evi-
dence that Lebanese officials knew of the massacres on Friday). 
249. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, art. 3. 
250. G.A. Res. 2200 (21), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 1967), 
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). 
251. G.A. Res. 2200 (21), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 1967), 
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
252. Mar. 12, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966). 
253. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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requirements of humane treatment under common article 3 of the 
Geneva Convention. Needless to say, the Phalangist commanders 
and soldiers who participated in or planned any aspect of the mas-
sacres would be individually liable for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, as well as for genocide under the Genocide Con-
vention.254 Although a Lebanese commission of inquiry has been 
established, it appears unlikely, given current political conditions, 
that any meaningful sanctions will be imposed.21111 
D. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide2116 was drafted following World War II to outlaw 
the Nazi government's atrocities on the basis of national, ethnic, 
racial or religious identification and to prevent the recurrence of 
such atrocities. 2117 Any recurrence of such atrocities by means of 
the Convention, however, cannot be prevented without rational 
and unflinching vigilance in enforcing its provisions. With obvious 
regret and reluctance, the question has been raised whether the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its involvement in the massacres of 
the Palestinian civilian population in Sabra and Shatilla constitute 
genocide. 2118 The pivotal substantive provisions are contained in 
254. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Dec. 9, 1938, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. See infra notes 256-77 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Genocide Convention) [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention]. 
255. S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 82. A report issued by Leba-
non's military prosecutor holds Israel "legally responsible" for the massacres. In addition: 
While Israel's Kahan report pinned the blame on Phalangist militiamen, the report 
by Mr. Assad Germanos, the Lebanese military prosecutor, suggests in carefully cho-
sen words that "border elements" (a clear reference to the militiamen of Major Saad 
Haddad) or "others who may have suffered from the excesses of the Palestinians" 
were responsible for the killings. The agency, which is close to the Phalange party 
and the Government, carried the text of the report. Mr. Germanos is himself a Phal-
ange sympathizer. 
The report exonerates the Phalange and the "Lebanese forces," the coalition of 
Christian militias, on the basis that "there is no sufficient evidence to suggest that 
either of the two commands had any advance knowledge of the events" and "it could 
not be determined that either of these commands had issued orders to their fighters." 
The Times (London), June 22, 1983, at 6, col. 7. 
256. Genocide Convention, supra note 254. 
257. S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 73. The Convention was 
adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in 1948. 3 U.N. GAOR, Part I, Annex 494, 
U.N. Doc. A/760 (1948). It was signed by the United States two days later. Lebanon and 
Israel are parties to it; the United States has yet to ratify it. 
258. See, e.g., S. MALLISON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 73 (suggesting Israeli 
action could constitute genocide); IsRAEL IN LEBANON, supra note 184, at 197 (majority of 
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Articles II and III. 259 The Convention may be analogized to the 
basic tenet of Anglo-American law that for criminal responsibility 
there must be an act or an omission to act where there is a legal 
duty to do so, plus the requisite intent for criminal liability. 280 To 
establish liability for genocide under the Convention, there must 
be one of the prohibited acts and the "intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."281 
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts under article 
3 "shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible 
rulers, public officials or private individuals. "282 
The Kahan Report concluded that the Phalangists were di-
rectly responsible for the killings and serious harm inflicted in the 
camps. As discussed above, Israel was under an affirmative duty to 
protect the civilian population in the refugee camps and failed to 
do so. Its failure to provide protection could be conceptualized 
under article III as direct and public incitement to commit geno-
the Commission view Israel's actions in Lebanon as a "form of genocide"). 
259. Article II. 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Article m. 
The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt tq commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
260. W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'IT, CRIMINAL LAw 175-77 (1972). 
261. Genocide Convention, supra note 254, art. II. 
262. Genocide Convention, supra note 254, art. IV. Article V requires contracting par-
ties to enact legislation in accordance with their constitutions to provide effective penalties 
for genocide, and article VI provides that persons charged with genocide should be tried in 
the state in which the act was committed or by an international tribunal with jurisdiction 
over the contracting parties. Both Lebanon and Israel are parties to the Convention. The 
question of jurisdiction over questions of genocide is beyond the scope of this article; it has 
been suggested that the Convention makes genocide an offense punishable by any state with 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See generally R LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND PoLICY 151-66 (1979) (containing a series of 
journal articles on these questions). These questions of jurisdiction and enactment of do-
mestic legislation have posed a major barrier to acceptance of the Convention, including 
acceptance by the United States. 
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cide, complicity in genocide or conspiracy to commit genocide. 
Whether Israel's responsibility for genocide can be based solely on 
the massacres263 turns primarily on the intent of those who permit-
ted the Phalangists to enter or failed to stop the Phalangists once 
the killing was known. 
A preliminary issue of intent is whether the massacres demon-
strated intent to destroy the Palestinians "in whole or in part." 
There has been much controversy over whether intent to kill only 
part of an ethnic group as opposed to intent to destroy the entire 
ethnic group or a substantial part of it is sufficient intent for geno-
cide. 264 Regardless of whether a restrictive interpretation of the 
requisite intent is accepted (that is, that there must have been in-
tent to destroy the Palestinians or a substantial number of the 
Palestinians as an ethnic group), a colorable argument could be 
made that the massacres were extensive enough to satisfy such an 
interpretation and to demonstrate an intent to destroy the Pales-
tinians as a viable entity. Whatever interpretation is accepted, the 
number of victims is of important evidentiary value for proving the 
necessary intent. 
Another unresolved issue is whether a party's reckless indiffer-
ence to the likelihood of a massacre of the Palestinians is sufficient 
"intent to destroy, in whole or in part" the Palestinians, or 
whether it is necessary that the party's actions were taken with the 
purpose or knowledge that a massacre of the Palestinians would 
occur. By analogy again to Anglo-American criminal law, in the 
second case there would be the requisite intent for intentional 
murder, whereas in the first there would be reckless or grossly neg-
ligent homicide.2615 Given the severity and seriousness of the crime 
of genocide, and the Convention's implicit emphasis on a high de-
gree of intent, it is the view of this author that recklessness or 
gross negligence would not be sufficient. The requisite intent 
should be intent to kill (or intent to seriously harm) Palestinians 
as an ethnic group, even if the precise degree of harm or extent of 
263. This section does not address the broader issue of whether the invasion itself and 
other acts pursuant to the invasion were acts of genocide. 
264. See generally Leblimc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Conven-
tion: The Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78 A.J.I.L. 369 (1984) (discusses the meaning of 
the U.N. Genocide Convention). 
265. Leblanc states: "It should be borne in mind that the drafters of the Convention 
distinguished between homicide and genocide. As they saw it, homicide becomes genocide 
when the underlying intent relates to a group: individuals are killed not for any reason 
peculiar to them but simply because they are members." Id. at 371. Analogies to homicide 
are made herein as to the degree of intent, not the nature of the intent. 
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killing was not specifically anticipated. 266 This interpretation is 
borne out by the negotiating history of the Convention and the 
defeated proposal of the Soviet Union's representative that acts 
that result in the destruction of groups be encompassed in the 
Convention. The United States representative opposed the propo-
sal as a "fundamental modification" of the definition of genocide 
requiring intent as an essential element of the crime.267 
Even if this high degree of intent is required, it should be 
pointed out that proof of the consequences that may be reasonably 
anticipated from a party's actions could be viewed as circumstan-
tial evidence of a party's actual intent.2~8 Therefore, the Report's 
conclusion that many of the nine named individuals knew or 
should have known a massacre would take place, or that it was 
taking place, may be evidence of their actual intent for a massacre 
to occur or continue. 
The Commission did find that the IDF entered West Beirut 
only to restore order after Bashir Jemayel's assassination.269 Yet 
the Commission was less charitable in its determination of the in-
tent of Sharon and Eitan in sending the Phalangists into the camp. 
The Report strongly suggests that Sharon knew that a massacre 
would occur.270 Sharon has stated that he had "anticipated civilian 
casualties," but not the extent to which they would occur.271 Simi-
larly, Eitan, according to the Report, perhaps hoped "that in the 
final analysis, the Phalangist excesses would not be on a large 
266. See generally L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN 
RIGHTS, 913-22 (1973) (sources noting the high standard of proof for intent under the 
Convention). 
267. Leblanc, supra note 264, at 371-72. 
268. Compare W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note 260, at 202-03 (discussing "presumed 
intent"). 
269. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. According to statements by Sharon, this as-
sertion was only "a smoke screen" because the actual intention was to destroy the remaining 
Palestinian guerillas in Lebanon (ostensibly including the 2000 Palestinian terrorists pur-
portedly sought in the camps that never materialized). N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, at A6, 
col. 5; Sunday Times (London), Sept. 29, 1982, at 8, cols. 2-5. See also S. MALLISON & W.T. 
MALLISON, supra note 39, at 28 (discussing the U.N. Security Council's inquiry into Israeli 
justification for attacking the camps). On September 18, 1982, the Washington Post carried 
a headline across the top of its first page that read: "Israelis Hunt Palestinian Sympathizers 
in Beirut: Christian Forces Join in Search." The article by Mr. Loren Jenkins stated that 
two days after the Israeli army drove into Moslem West Beirut, the search for Palestinian 
sympathizers started. It continues: "Plainclothes security agents, carrying lists of names, led 
squads of soldiers through the streets in search of presumed enemies to interrogate." Wash-
ington Post, Sept. 18, 1982, at A1, col. 4. 
270. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
271. Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1982, at A1, col. 5. 
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scale."272 In an interview two days after the entry into West Beirut, 
Eitan said: "We are going to mop up West Beirut, gather all the 
weapons, arrest the terrorists, exactly like we did in Sidon and 
Tyre and in all other placed in Lebanon. We will find all the ter-
rorists and their leaders. We will destroy whatever requires de-
struction."273 The use of terms such as "purifying and purging,"274 
"mopping up,"275 and "cleaning up"276 the camps do not reflect fa-
vorably on the Israeli officials' and commanders' actual intent. In-
deed, the report of an international commission into Israel's viola-
tions of international law during the invasion concluded: "The 
massacres that took place in Sabra and Shatilla in September 1982 
can be described as genocidal massacres, and the term ' complicity 
in genocide' is wide enough to establish the responsibility of Israel 
for these acts. "277 
272. See supra note 19S and accompanying text. 
273. SABRA AND SHATILLA, supra note 22, at 14. In SABRA AND SHATILLA, Kapeliouk 
notes two Israeli sources of the opinion that the massacres were intended to provoke a mas-
sive exodus of Palestinians from Lebanon: 
Ze'ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha'aretz, and Ehud Ya'ari, Israeli televi-
sion's specialist on Arab affairs, both subscribe to this theory. The methodical de-
struction of Palestinian homes clearly supports it; for without their shelter, the Pales-
tinian refugees would have no alternative but to leave Lebanon. Contrary to some 
claims, when the Phalangists requested bulldozers from the Israelis they did not in-
tend to tear down barricades. On the basis of aerial photographs in their possession, 
Israeli military authorities knew quite well that there were no roadblocks or barri-
cades in the camps. The bulldozers had no other use but to destroy homes and bury 
corpses in mass graves. On November 7, General Yaron stated before the Commission 
of Inquiry: "We knew they wanted to destroy the camps ..• Some of them [the 
Phalangists] affirmed that they were planning to replace the camps with a zoo." 
Id. at 45. 
274. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 19S2, at A6, col. 5; Washington Post, Sept. 21, 19S2, at A14, 
col. 6. 
275. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 19S2, at AS, col. 4. 
276. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 19S2, at AS, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 19S2, at All, col. 
2. Similarly, extensive bombing of the Palestinian camps and their bulldozing (see S. MALLI-
SON & W.T. MALLISON, supra note 39, at 61-64; M JANSEN, supra note 16, at 15-3S) may be 
circumstantial evidence of an intent to drive the Palestinians, not merely Palestinian "ter-
rorists," out of Lebanon. The Report states only that West Beirut was "occasionally shelled 
and bombed" by Israeli forces. KAHAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. 
277. IsRAEL IN LEBANON, supra note 184, at 196. The Commission was chaired by Sean 
MacBride, former Irish Foreign Minister, former United States Commissioner for Namibia 
and Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1974. Four of the Commission'!) six members concluded 
that Israel embarked on "deliberate destruction of the national and cultural rights and iden-
tity of the Palestinian people" amounting to genocide but not in the sense of extermination 
of the Palestinians in a physical sense. The other two took the view that "while Israeli 
policy and practices in Lebanon are a violation of international humanitarian law, they do 
not amount to the crime of genocide." 
"The commission unanimously concluded, however, that Israel was involved in the 
planning and preparation of the massacres (at Sabra and Chatila [sic]) and played a facilita-
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CoNCLUSION 
It is in some ways easier to understand and grieve the death of 
one person than that of thousands. Perhaps as a result, a tragedy 
of human history is that massacres of civilian populations did not 
end with World War II. One aspect of the aftermath of that war's 
atrocities, however, was the creation of precepts of international 
law to deter the recurrence of such atrocities and, failing that, to 
punish their perpetrators. The potential for justice and orderly res-
olution exists. Among other principles of customary international 
law, the Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg Principles and the 
Genocide Convention provide an international framework for reso-
lution of responsibility and punishment for massacres of civilian 
populations. 
The Kahan Report, no matter how well intentioned, failed to 
result in any meaningful sanctions. Begin, Sharon and Shamir were 
all criticized by the Commission; yet Begin recently retired,278 
Shamir became the Prime Minister,279 and Sharon remained in the 
Cabinet (although without his portfolio).280 The Report may have 
appeased many consciences, but wrongly so. The inquiry is full of 
sound and fury, but ultimately, for the many victims of the mas-
sacres, signifies nothing. 
tive role in the actual killings." The Times (London), Feb. 3, 1983, at 8, col. 7. 
278. In a recent article on Begin's resignation, political correspondent Mark Segal 
speculated that the "cruelest moment" for Begin in his Lebanese adventure "came when 
Begin finally recognized the reckless and irresponsible advice he had accepted from the two 
generals he so admired and trusted-Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan." He goes on to remark 
that "Begin may today regret not having carried out the implied recommendation of the 
Kahan Report by dismissing Sharon from his cabinet." Jerusalem Post, Sept. 25-0ct. 1, 
1983, at 15, cols. 5-6 (Int'l ed.). 
279. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1983, at Al, col. 4, A3, col. 1 (setting forth the relatively 
unchanged list of Cabinet members, including Mordechai Zipori as Minister of 
Communications). 
280. Sharon has said that "as long as he continues to have some influence, he would 
continue to serve in the government." Jerusalem Post, July 31-Aug. 6, 1983, at 9, col. 1 (lnt'l 
ed.). To quote Jonathan Randal, senior foreign correspondent of the Washington Post: 
The main culprit, Ariel Sharon, neatly dodged the spirit if not the letter of the lOS-
page report enjoining him to resign. Resign he did as Defense Minister, only to stay 
on as minister without portfolio and to join two key parliamentary commissions, on 
defense and Lebanese affairs. Sharon made clear this was his, and Begin's, way of 
rejecting the commission's verdict of Israel's "indirect responsibility" for the 
slaughter. 
J. RANDAL, supra note 35, at 289. 
